(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

PART

FOREIGN OFFICE	DEPT. EASTERN

TITLE: JORDAN: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

File No. EJ 1/16

W 010

CLOSED UNTIL 1999

REFER TO			REFER TO					DATE
DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.		
	A Beamish	~~2/9~~						
	~~A BEAMISH~~	~~28/9~~						
	~~J. MOBERLY~~	~~29/9~~						
	M.D.							
	Mr. Paul	S/T.						
	NEAD.							
	Northern	19/2						
	Ashdown PHCE	20/2						
	Mr Fullerton							
	Mr Weir							
	M. Daly	18/6						
	Reg	19/8						
E	MD	16/9						
	Reg.	25/9						
	MD	30/9						
	Reg	7/10						

2/12 Closed.

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

OPENED	FILE CLOSED	FILE No.	PART
2019	18-9-68	EJ 1/16	

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Gp. 610

FOLIO NUMBERS OF TOP SECRET AND SECRET DOCUMENTS IN THIS JACKET

FORMER FILES to 1966 files

RELATED FILES

EJ 1/15

(1) E

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15
20 SEP 1967
EJ 1/1C

CONFIDENTIAL

Summary of Amman Despatch No. 16 of the 16th of September, 1967: Jordan's Problems and Prospects

Despite the diplomatic activity of the past three months, since the defeat of the Arab armies, and King Hussein's efforts to gain support for Jordan, the future is uncertain and unpromising (paras 1 - 3)

2. The potential dangers to the régime, which immediately after the war were thought likely to bring the régime down unless urgent precautions were taken, have not developed despite the government's inaction. The army appears to remain loyal and part of the refugee problem is being efficiently handled by UNRWA. But the government seems unable to cope with its economic problems. The political temperature has been kept down by the King's policy of drumming up support for Jordan and encouragement to West Bankers, although these may be more attracted by a separate settlement with Israel the longer the present division continues (paras. 4 - 6).

3. Many external dangers to the régime have evaporated in the climate of Arab solidarity. But the King himself still doubts whether he could risk separate negotiations at this stage. Jordan's hopes are at present pinned on a solution being arrived at and imposed by the United Nations. Only if negotiations there fail may Hussein feel free to "go it alone". Britain should do her best with her allies to secure the minimum terms necessary to ensure the maintenance of a moderate régime in Jordan (paras. 7 - 9).

5. An East Bank Jordan would probably be economically and politically unviable. Jordanians, supported and led by an army faction, might repudiate their leaders

/if

if they failed to regain the West Bank at least. Jordan will need shoring-up during the months ahead (paras. 10 - 12).

6. Britain alone cannot carry Jordan and there will have to be agreement with the United States about the level of aid and financial support. At the same time the Jordan government will have to put up a better show, especially on the economic front, than it has so far done. The Arabs, too, have an important part to play in supporting Jordan, not least in agreeing to a realistic settlement with Israel, including an end to belligerency. If they cannot go all the way, they should at least not attack Jordan if she seeks a separate settlement (paras. 13 - 14).

7. The opportunities for a wider, long-term settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute seem less bright than they appeared immediately after the war. But Israel would seem to have much to gain in the long run from a less rigid attitude to the Arabs, and Jordan in particular, especially if the ascendancy of the moderates at the Khartoum summit proves not to be a nine-days wonder. Jordan's survival as a moderate régime probably depends on the return of the West Bank before too much time elapses (paras. 15 - 17).

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN.
16 September, 1967.

No. 16 ✓
(1013/67)

Sir,

More than three months have passed since the shattering defeat of Jordan's army, with those of Egypt and Syria, in the Arab-Israel war. In the light of all that has happened since then it is appropriate to try to take stock. The Arab Summit meeting in Khartoum is over and Jordan knows what support to expect from her sister states. The King's rallying of friends in the immediate post-war period is also over, although he is still engaged in strengthening Islamic ties. He has tested the attitude to Jordan in Washington, London and Paris and has arranged a visit to Moscow in early October. One session of the United Nations on the Middle East crisis is over and another is just about to begin. Jordan's future, however, remains obscure, for there are many uncertainties. For example, can agreement on any resolution on the Middle East be reached by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and manoeuvred through the United Nations; and if so, could such a resolution, in default of Arab-Israeli acquiescence, be enforced against the wishes of the parties most concerned after mediation had failed? Another imponderable is whether Jordan, in the absence of any wider settlement, would agree to negotiate with Israel. Could the rump of Jordan survive even the coming, almost certainly long drawn out, period of international discussion? In this despatch I have the honour against this background to examine Jordan's present situation and to survey her prospects.

The Right Honourable
George Brown, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

/2.

2. The state of shock which I described in my despatch No. 13 of the 29th of June has passed, but no one in Jordan has any clear idea of or confidence in the future. No popular hopes are now pinned on a solution to Jordan's troubles through "another crack at Israel". Russia's support for the Arabs has been quite soberly assessed and the U.S.S.R. is no longer the looked-for saviour; the Arab Summit meeting, crowning as it did King Hussein's search for material and moral support, has left many questions unanswered, but has for the moment apparently been accepted here as endorsement of the "soft line" - that is, "no war". Jordanians are now back where the more percipient of their number were in the immediate aftermath of the war realising that there can be no Middle East settlement without agreement between the two "super-powers" Russia and America. Most Jordanians seem to hope that some solution will be arrived at in the United Nations and imposed on the parties to the dispute. The King has done his best (and considering his defeat and the state of his country, he has done remarkably well) to gain sympathy and support for Jordan and Jordan's case both from the Arabs and in the world at large. Having persistently advocated an Arab Summit meeting he is very pleased with the success of the moderates at Khartoum. This satisfaction is shared by his people and gives them hope that wide support can be mustered at the United Nations for the Arab, and particularly Jordan's, case.

3. However, these are large issues which will be dealt with in an international forum which to many Jordanians seems remote from their daily problems. Even if they have vague hopes that the great Powers will pull the Arab chestnuts out of the fire, they still have to earn their daily keep in the very difficult circumstances of to-day.

/4.

4. In my despatch No. 13 I described the lack of control from the centre and the potential dangers to the régime from the very real feeling of despair and disgrace among the people and the army. So far as the country itself is concerned, control is only marginally better: there is still a feeling of drift and inaction, and a growing realisation that the government are unable to cope. Yet there has been no move against the King - indeed he has strengthened his position by the prominent and successful part he has played in drawing the Arabs together and in securing help and understanding for Jordan. In June we examined the likely pressures which we thought might build up to threaten the stability and perhaps the very existence of the régime. The greatest danger seemed to be in the army, where many junior officers were bitter about the incompetence of their commanders, and the rank and file with the cowardice of many of their officers during the fighting. Only swift action by the King in court-martialling the cowards and sacking the incompetents seemed likely to retain the army's loyalty. We believed, too, that the re-equipment of the army and the air force was a pressing need if the officers were not to turn sour. So far as we know, no one in the army has been court-martialled, although four Royal Jordanian Air Force ~~Hunter~~ pilots were dismissed for alleged cowardice at the end of the war. There have been no premature retirements, and the most that has been done is to reshuffle some commanders and staff officers in the army. Re-equipment of the army has hardly begun and until the 9th of September, when three R.A.F. Hunters were flown in Jordanian colours to Amman from Khormakser, the R.J.A.F. had only one operational Hunter. Yet all the indications are that the King and his senior officers can still count on the loyalty of the armed forces and at present public security is good.

/5.

5. The influx of over 200,000 refugees from the West Bank, together with the reduction in Jordan's economy through the country being split in half, seemed to us at the time likely to create unbearable problems for the régime. Indeed, the early handling of the refugees and the continuing inertia of the Ministries concerned with the economy was deplorable. Despite this, there is no widespread economic distress: the shops are full, there is ample food and the refugees and other displaced persons from the West Bank, now that UNRWA has assumed responsibility for most of them, are being cared for. The good weather and the abundant fruit and vegetable crops coming over from the West Bank with the tacit consent of the Israelis while a wide range of consumer goods and cigarettes is being smuggled the other way, have combined to mitigate distress among the poorer sections of the community. Contributions from Her Majesty's Government and other countries for relief, rehabilitation and development have helped provide funds for labour intensive projects. But in this field too, the Jordan government have not measured up to
--- their difficulties. The enclosed note illustrates some of the economic problems to be solved and the government's failure to match up to its responsibilities. There is no 'economic' overlord and the Keynesian policies of the Minister of National Economy are frustrated in the Cabinet by the orthodox financial arguments of the Minister of Finance. Jordan's reserves now stand at some £94 million, to which a further £10 million will be added on the 15th of October if the pledging countries at the Arab Summit keep their promise to pay the first quarterly instalment of the £40 million contribution to Jordan. This £104 million represents almost two years' imports at 1966 levels i.e. for a united Jordan. Yet, so far, none of these reserves has been committed to development schemes. Aid givers are surely going to look hard at the logic of making

/funds

funds available to a country with unemployed financial reserves of this magnitude.

6. Politically there have been no serious differences between the régime and the people in the past three months. The policy of strengthening Jordan's ties with other Arab states, of explaining her difficulties and drumming up support has had everyone's approval. Relations with the West Bank and public pronouncements by the King and the government have not so far inclined West Bank 'separatists' to look very seriously for association with Israel, rather than an eventual return to a unified Jordan. But this is potentially the most dangerous of Jordan's problems. The longer Israeli occupation continues the greater the danger (according to Tel Aviv telegram No. 1012 to the Foreign Office) of West Bankers opting for some sort of association with Israel, as a means of ending Israeli military occupation. Reunification with Jordan must in my view soon be shown to be a likely alternative if practical advantages, combined with Israeli pressures and disillusionment with Arab ineffectiveness, are not to work in favour of some formal accommodation between the West Bank and Israel.

7. Many of the former dangers to the régime have for the present evaporated in the new phase of Arab co-operation and brotherliness. However, the policy of Syria and Algeria is a reminder that the Khartoum Summit did not achieve complete Arab unity. Nor on past form are the Arabs themselves likely for long to act as if even the impact of Israel's victory had permanently removed their mutual differences and hostility to each other. If no satisfactory settlement with Israel is forthcoming within the foreseeable future, we should not be surprised if the Arabs once more turn in on themselves and resume their internecine warfare. But in the meantime King Hussein should be free

/from

from effective, revolutionary Arab attacks on his position - unless Syria, as the odd man out, decides once more to work for the end of the Hashemite régime. King Hussein, however, is being cautious and has not so far thought the situation sufficiently safe, or the likely advantages enough, for him to negotiate first and separately with Israel. His instinct in this is probably right: he does not wholly trust his Arab peers' agreement for him to go ahead and negotiate with Israel for the return of his lost territories, in advance of a general settlement. Nor does he wish to go down in history as the Arab monarch who "betrayed" the cause of Palestine by initiating negotiations with the Israelis. I believe King Hussein will wish to see what emerges from the United Nations before deciding whether he should "go it alone". If no satisfactory solution came out of the United Nations, then the King might think he was justified in entering into negotiations with Israel for the return of his lost territories. There is also the possibility that King Hussein might throw in his hand rather than do this. He probably realises that Arab leaders are as yet ahead of their people in appreciating the need for negotiations rather than embarking on another disastrous war with Israel. Having fed their people on a diet of fantastic propaganda, especially regarding Israel, over the past twenty years at least, Arab leaders cannot now overnight repudiate the line they have peddled and hope to retain the support of the masses. Some time would have to be allowed for re-education and for the Arab people to be brought to see the facts of the present situation. King Hussein's concern not to get too far out in front therefore probably outweighs any faith he may have in the thesis that he would get better terms from Israel the sooner he starts to negotiate.

8. In deciding his course of action the King will undoubtedly have in mind the vital importance of

/getting

getting his timing right. While the United Nations are in play he may calculate that Israel will not further alienate opinion there by any irrevocable action over the West Bank. He must feel sure of his army - he has been more absent from Jordan since the war (as has his Chief of Staff) than anyone with doubts about the loyalty of his army would dared to have been. He appears to have been reassured about the loyalty of West Bankers. He knows his people will not starve, so he probably considers that he can and should await the outcome of the United Nations discussions before deciding what he will do about talks with Israel.

9. In the absence of a general Arab-Israel settlement and until the resources of the United Nations have been exhausted, including perhaps the appointment of a U.N. mediator or Secretary-General's Special representative, it looks, therefore, as if Jordan-Israel negotiations over the return of the West Bank and Jerusalem will not get started. Britain's best hope of helping Jordan lies through the United Nations and, as we have decided with the Americans that the maintenance of a moderate Jordan is still in our interests, our efforts there should presumably be directed to securing the minimum terms which will help to ensure the continued existence of a unified Jordan. In other words, we must support those who demand the return of the West Bank and Jerusalem to Jordan. Meanwhile we should continue our careful and valuable contributions, including advice on policy, towards keeping Jordan economically afloat within the limits of her present frontiers.

10. An East Bank Jordan could in theory be made "viable" in time by massive injections of foreign aid, as the enclosed economic summary by Mr. Hudson of the Middle East Development Division shows; but it is

/doubtful

doubtful whether in the long term this would be worthwhile. A rump Transjordan - that is with the West Bank indefinitely lost - would be a depressingly insignificant state. As regards its human resources, how many Palestinians, who have so far provided most of the business and technical skills, would wish to live on in a state whose economic and political future as a second Transjordan seemed so uncertain? Already this Embassy is receiving a flood of applications from young Palestinians from the East Bank as well as from Gaza and the West Bank who wish to emigrate to Canada, Australia and to the Arab states of the Gulf. This seems a bad augury for a state already desperately short of competent executives. Nor can one rule out that as a result of Israeli policy Transjordan might eventually find itself saddled permanently with an additional 300-400,000 refugees from Gaza and the West Bank.

11. What sort of political figure would such a state cut? What sort of weight would be given to its advice in inter-Arab councils? Would King Hussein consent to rule over such a rump? He has said privately that he would not. More to the point, would the Jordanians continue to acknowledge a King who not only had lost the war, but lost the peace as well? It would be well here to note a general opinion among professional Jordanians in Amman: that the present government is bungling affairs, while ministers line their pockets and the King's uncle and the former Prime Minister, Bahjat Talhouni, are said to be making a fortune out of refugees' rations. This disillusionment could in time spread to the young army officers, whose background in many cases is similar to that of their contemporaries in business. If that were to happen, the country's sheet anchor would be lost and with it the present régime.

/12.

12. It would be wise, therefore, to recognise that, especially in the absence of any wider Arab-Israel settlement, Jordan's situation is likely to continue to be very precarious for some time to come. If a moderate Jordan is to survive action will be required in the short term to see that political and economic incompetence, despair and subversion do not over the next few months eat into the fabric of the state and bring it down. The longer term problem is to get the best terms possible from Israel, which if pressures on the King are not eventually to become intolerable, would have to include the return of most of the West Bank.

13. There will have to be wide support in helping Jordan over the next year. Britain cannot successfully act alone. We have not for more than a decade been able on our own to "carry" Jordan and the major burden must be borne by others. However, as one of the major aid givers we should seek to persuade the United States Government that in present circumstances it is not narrow considerations of orthodox aid procedures which should prevail in discussions about what Jordan requires. It would be wise, also to engage the interest of other NATO countries in support of Jordan (and our other Middle Eastern friends) in these difficult days. On the other hand, in her own interests Jordan must be brought to take a realistic view of her economic problems. If the administration here is either unwilling or unable to accept advice about getting through the economic difficulties of the future, or if sectional and private interests are allowed to intrude, then King Hussein should be left in no doubt about the dangers to his own position arising from the shortcomings of his ministers and advisers. We have all too often in the past few months had examples

/of

of the sheer incapacity of the present administration to grapple with the problems created by the war.

14. In the international sphere Britain should use her influence to get the best deal possible for Jordan. We must recognise that without the return of the West Bank the political future of the régime and the very existence of a moderate Jordan will be in grave peril. The Arabs, if they care for a moderate Jordan, must be prepared to pay the price, not only by financial support, but also in political sacrifices which Israel may insist on. At their lowest these would include an ending of belligerency. If for internal political reasons some Arab states cannot yet go this far they should at least explicitly acknowledge that Jordan's is a special case and that failing a wider Arab-Israel settlement Jordan must herself decide whether or not, in order to survive, she must come to terms with the victor. Any less help to Jordan from her Arab sister states should be taken as a measure of their real concern for Jordan's survival in the moderate camp.

15. These are depressing thoughts, especially when one considers the hopes for a wider and more lasting Arab-Israel settlement which the recent war seemed to raise in the immediate aftermath of Israel's victory. Developments since then, and the increasing rigidity of Israel on the one hand and the frightened immobility of Arab leaders on the other, make one wonder whether there really is any chance at present of doing more than struggle for a <u>modus vivendi</u> in the area, which will leave unsolved many of the pre-and post-war differences between the parties involved. Of course, much will depend on the durability of current Arab solidarity and the success of moderate Arab leaders in educating the Arab masses, after twenty years of phoney history, in the realities of power politics

/in

in the 20th century. We have witnessed Arab honeymoons before and the bitter quarrels which have invariably succeeded them. I think, therefore, we need to give more time for recent Arab initiatives - and they have been as dramatic as any in the past decade - to prove whether anyone in the Arab world has turned over a new leaf or whether the wheel will come again full circle, leaving the Arabs in disarray and Israel that much stronger.

16. Israel, herself, would do well to consider whether her increasingly rigid attitude on such points as the return of refugees and of territory, and on the question of Jerusalem as regards Islam, will in the long run be in her own best interests. While one can appreciate the argument that a victor in such a war as that seen by Israel to have been provoked by the Arabs against her, has every justification in insisting on peace on her terms, there is much to be said in the present circumstances for looking beyond the immediate future. Israel's national security certainly requires a minimum of guarantees and concessions from the Arabs and she has the right to hold out for these. But her leaders would do well to consider what sort of legacy of bitterness and revenge may be left, if they exact too high a price from the Arabs They would also do well to play along, for a while at least, to see whether the success of the moderate Arabs at Khartoum really means that in their heart of hearts Nasser, Aref and other Arab leaders, including Hussein, know that they must revise their policies towards Israel and prepare public opinion for a volte face. However disappointing the final communique may have been for Israel, the moderates achieved far more than anyone had a right to expect. Is Israel's security for only five or ten years, at the price of massive rearmament and increasingly expensive weapons,

/to

to be preferred to a more permanent settlement worked out over a period of months, even perhaps years, which embraces the recognition of Israel and the ending of belligerency? In the case of Jordan, the return of the West Bank (with minor frontier rectifications), concessions over the return of refugees, and a willingness to discuss the future of Jerusalem would at least seem reasonable, in return for a lengthy peace on Israel's long eastern border.

17. We are told that Israel is not much interested in the survival of the Hashemite régime, and dismisses the argument that the Hashemites offer the best chance of a moderate state on Israel's eastern front. But it is difficult to believe that even the "hard-liners" and the "hawks" in Israel would welcome a campaign of sabotage, subversion and resistance on the West Bank of Jordan or a long series of raids and retaliation across the Jordan. Such campaigns have a habit over the years of evolving into something which punitive raids and reprisals cannot contain, e.g. Algeria and Vietnam. This, however, is what they should expect if King Hussein is indefinitely refused the minimum terms on which he could negotiate. While the King is seen to be active in seeking help for Jordan and until the disillusionment and misery of the refugee camps spreads to the public at large, he is probably safe enough. But if there is no sign of a return of Jordan's lost territories, and with them the possibility of the refugees going home, criticism of the régime will mount and the temptation and justification for a <u>coup d'état</u> to replace an ineffective monarch by a military junta will become almost irresistable. No one should suppose that such a junta would in time be able to "deliver" more than the King could. Thus would begin a cycle of <u>coups</u> and insurrections so familiar in

/neighbouring

neighbouring Syria. It is significant that there are already among Jordan's more responsible and solid political and military leaders those who advocate guerilla warfare on the West Bank, despite the repression this would entail there, simply because they see no other way of containing the mounting frustrations of the Jordanian people. They have no illusions about the hopelessness of such a course, but they consider it more honourable and supportable than supine acceptance of defeat, with no respectable settlement.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's representatives at Washington, Beirut, Jedda, Bahrain, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, U.K. Mission, New York, and to Her Majesty's Consul-General in Jerusalem.

I have the honour to be
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(P.G.D. Adams)

CONFIDENTIAL

A Note on the Economy of Jordan

June to December 1967

The most immediate effect of the war and the loss of the West Bank has been a severe fall both in the domestic revenues received by the government and the foreign exchange receipts of the country. Little improvement can be expected in the period to the end of the year.

2. Income from Customs dues (which account for half the domestic revenues) has been affected by the fall in imports and direct tax revenues have fallen because there are now fewer tax payers and because the level of economic activity has been considerably reduced. Domestic revenue for 1967 is estimated at some JD.21 million (against a revised pre-war budget estimate of JD.32 million) though most of this is attributable to the first half of the year. Current expenditure, including military and public security is expected to stay broadly at its original level of JD.49 million. Thus, assuming that British and American budget support remains at approximately JD.11 million for the year, there would emerge an "extraordinary" current deficit of JD.17 million.

3. The relation between this deficit, development expenditures, extraordinary expenditures on refugees and military re-equipment, and the money received for military re-equipment, development loans and the recent "first aid" gifts (estimated at JD.17 million) is not easy to determine. It would appear, however, that, taking the current and capital accounts together, there is a reasonable chance of an overall balance being achieved by the end of the year, excluding any new Arab funds which may be received.

4. The balance of payments, paradoxically, is likely to be in a better position than it has ever been, quite apart from the effects of substantial receipts of grant aid from abroad. Exports have not been affected very much and the decline of imports in the second half of the year has more than compensated for the loss of earnings from tourism and remittances.

5. At the end of July the currency in circulation amounted to JD.47 million, though this was not a true indication of the level of economic activity, for money is being hoarded at all levels of the community, reflecting current uncertainties, a reluctance to spend now in view of harder times ahead and perhaps some lack of confidence in the banking system. The tendency now is for the merchant community to make transactions only in cash.

6. With a country where industry and trade is marking time, where unemployment is increasing, where confidence is at a low ebb and where many businesses are being kept afloat merely by the extension of credit facilities, any move towards re-activating the economy must come from the government. Apart from the injection of some capital into local industry and the continuation of a number of public works projects, there does not appear to be much comprehensive forward thinking or contingency planning for next year. Unless such planning starts now and the government puts major projects in hand the economy will by the Spring have stagnated to a much more serious extent than it has so far.

7. There seem to be three main reasons why no effective long term planning is being done: there is no single head of economic affairs in Jordan who could make practical decisions and have them carried out; the psychological effect of the war has made coherent thinking difficult and also made it impossible for many Jordanians to plan on the basis that they might <u>not</u> retrieve the West Bank: and the country has too rigid a monetary system that allows large reserves to be built up and not fully utilised.

8. With total foreign exchange reserves at JD. 94 million the government is still saying that it needs money to implement projects and get the economy moving.

/It

It would not be irresponsible of aid donors to advocate that some of the "free' (i.e. not earmarked) reserves at least might be used for this purpose. The Americans certainly feel that more aid for Jordan would be difficult to justify unless the authorities are seen to be not only using all the means at their disposal but also presenting a detailed programme of development projects for serious consideration.

PROSPECTS FOR 1968

The Return of the West Bank

9. If the West Bank were regained by the beginning of next year then the dislocation to the economy could probably be basically rectified within the following 12 months, providing the immediate problem of refugees on the West Bank, including those from Gaza, had been dealt with. Jordan would also, however, have had to reach an accommodation with Israel over Jerusalem, with its implications for tourist revenues.

10. Current civil expenditure by the government would probably remain high and it is unlikely that there would be any significant reduction in military or public security spending for next year at least. Domestic revenues would gradually improve in line with the growth of economic activity and the return of confidence. Exports would be maintained and remittances from abroad resumed. Imports, despite controls, could be expected to rise and the payments gap could probably be bridged either by Arab grants or support from other sources.

An East Bank Jordan

11. If Jordan does not regain the West Bank the picture is much less clear or favourable. There would be immense difficulties in finding work for the new refugees in addition to workers made redundant by the lack of demand in local industry and services. Civil government expenditure would be cut to some extent, although public security would have to be maintained

/much

much at its present level, as indeed would the army, if only because there would be few jobs for discharged soldiers.

12. Despite these new difficulties, economic activity would inevitably recover to some extent and domestic revenues increase. Everything would depend on the government's policies and competence in managing the economy. There would be a large budget deficit but this could probably be bridged by Arab funds and other support. Nevertheless, only with internal and external political stability, and a drastic reduction in the level of military spending, perhaps by 50 per cent, together with a reasonable level of economic activity, could there be any chance of the deficit being reduced to manageable proportions by the early 1970s. On present form these requirements seem unattainable.

13. When, therefore, can Trans-Jordan hope to become viable on the basis of any reasonable standard of life for its people? It would be over-optimistic to assume that this could happen before the early 1980s for the odds against seem too great: they include doubts about political stability, the probable emigration of Palestinian business men and technicians who would take their money and skills with them: and the inability and lack of will of the government (on form so far) to adopt and carry out economic policies which will strengthen the economy and restore confidence in the private sector and among the country's creditors.

W 1

Reference EJ 1/16

Mr. Rich

Ephemeral

Pse. see Mr. Adams despatch No. 16 of 16 September.

2. I recommend that this despatch be printed and given FO/CO/WH distribution. In view of the fact that Mr. Adams' views about Jordan's problems & prospects correspond with our own I do not recommend submission now as I consider priority printing necessary.

L.T. 3. I have prepared a copy of the despatch for the printers.

J.J. Bearcroft

Mr. Bearcroft RTB 25/9 21/9

Approved for FO/WH Print, except Enclosure marked for Volume only.

Copy given to Mr. Moore, with recommendation for Priority printing, but not Submission.

Please arrange for Miss Forsyth, PSV.S.D., to have a copy — she has asked for 2 additional copies of all Despts. sent for print. Please also ensure that Mr. Hibberd sees O.V.

JR 25/9

E. Div.

Pse. arrange* Spare sent 25/9 JC

*

Mr. Mobsby to see O.K. NOTED

25/8

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

EJ 1/16

Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

ARCHIVES COPY
NOT FOR CIRCULATION

JORDAN
20 September, 1967
Section 1

JORDAN'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Mr. Adams to Mr. Brown. (*Received 20 September*)

SUMMARY

Despite the diplomatic activity of the past three months, since the defeat of the Arab armies and King Hussein's efforts to gain support for Jordan, the future is uncertain and unpromising. (Paragraphs 1–3.)

2. The potential dangers to the régime, which immediately after the war were thought likely to bring the régime down unless urgent precautions were taken, have not developed despite the Government's inaction. The army appears to remain loyal and part of the refugee problem is being efficiently handled by UNRWA. But the Government seems unable to cope with its economic problems. The political temperature has been kept down by the King's policy of drumming up support for Jordan and encouragement to West Bankers, although these may be more attracted by a separate settlement with Israel the longer the present division continues. (Paragraphs 4–6.)

3. Many external dangers to the régime have evaporated in the climate of Arab solidarity. But the King himself still doubts whether he could risk separate negotiations at this stage. Jordan's hopes are at present pinned on a solution being arrived at and imposed by the United Nations. Only if negotiations there fail may Hussein feel free to " go it alone ". Britain should do her best with her allies to secure the minimum terms necessary to ensure the maintenance of a moderate régime in Jordan. (Paragraphs 7–9.)

4. An East Bank Jordan would probably be economically and politically unviable. Jordanians, supported and led by an army faction, might repudiate their leaders if they failed to regain the West Bank at least. Jordan will need shoring-up during the months ahead. (Paragraphs 10–12.)

5. Britain alone cannot carry Jordan and there will have to be agreement with the United States about the level of aid and financial support. At the same time the Jordan Government will have to put up a better show, especially on the economic front, than it has so far done. The Arabs, too, have an important part to play in supporting Jordan, not least in agreeing to a realistic settlement with Israel, including an end to belligerency. If they cannot go all the way, they should at least not attack Jordan if she seeks a separate settlement. (Paragraphs 13–14.)

6. The opportunities for a wider, long-term settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute seem less bright than they appeared immediately after the war. But Israel would seem to have much to gain in the long run from a less rigid attitude to the Arabs, and Jordan in particular, especially if the ascendancy of the moderates at the Khartoum Summit proves not to be a nine-days wonder. Jordan's survival as a moderate régime probably depends on the return of the West Bank before too much time elapses. (Paragraphs 15–17.)

20398—280 8230—44

(No. 16. Confidential) *Amman,*
Sir, *16 September, 1967.*

More than three months have passed since the shattering defeat of Jordan's Army, with those of Egypt and Syria, in the Arab-Israel war. In the light of all that has happened since then it is appropriate to try to take stock. The Arab Summit meeting in Khartoum is over and Jordan knows what support to expect from her sister States. The King's rallying of friends in the immediate post-war period is also over, although he is still engaged in strengthening Islamic ties. He has tested the attitude to Jordan in Washington, London and Paris and has arranged a visit to Moscow in early October. One session of the United Nations on the Middle East crisis is over and another is just about to begin. Jordan's future, however, remains obscure, for there are many uncertainties. For example, can agreement on any resolution on the Middle East be reached by the United States and the USSR and manoeuvred through the United Nations; and, if so, could such a resolution, in default of Arab-Israeli acquiescence, be enforced against the wishes of the parties most concerned after mediation had failed? Another imponderable is whether Jordan, in the absence of any wider settlement, would agree to negotiate with Israel. Could the rump of Jordan survive even the coming, almost certainly long drawn out, period of international discussion? In this despatch I have the honour against this background to examine Jordan's present situation and to survey her prospects.

2. The state of shock which I described in my despatch No. 13 of the 29th of June has passed, but no one in Jordan has any clear idea of or confidence in the future. No popular hopes are now pinned on a solution to Jordan's troubles through "another crack at Israel". Russia's support for the Arabs has been quite soberly assessed and the USSR is no longer the looked-for saviour; the Arab Summit meeting, crowning as it did King Hussein's search for material and moral support, has left many questions unanswered, but has for the moment apparently been accepted here as endorsement of the "soft line"—that is, "no war"; Jordanians are now back where the more percipient of their number were in the immediate aftermath of the war realising that there can be no Middle East settlement without agreement between the two "super-Powers" Russia and America. Most Jordanians seem to hope that some solution will be arrived at in the United Nations and imposed on the parties to the dispute. The King has done his best (and considering his defeat and the state of his country, he has done remarkably well) to gain sympathy and support for Jordan and Jordan's case both from the Arabs and in the world at large. Having persistently advocated an Arab Summit meeting he is very pleased with the success of the moderates at Khartoum. This satisfaction is shared by his people and gives them hope that wide support can be mustered at the United Nations for the Arab, and particularly Jordan's, case.

3. However, these are large issues which will be dealt with in an international forum which to many Jordanians seems remote from their daily problems. Even if they have vague hopes that the Great Powers will pull the Arab chestnuts out of the fire, they still have to earn their daily keep in the very difficult circumstances of to-day.

4. In my despatch No. 13 I described the lack of control from the centre and the potential dangers to the régime from the very real feeling of despair and disgrace among the people and the army. So far as the country itself is concerned, control is only marginally better: there is still a feeling of drift and inaction, and a growing realisation that the Government are unable to cope. Yet there has been no move against the King—indeed he has strengthened his position by the prominent and successful part he has played in drawing the Arabs together and in securing help and understanding for Jordan. In June we examined the likely pressures which we thought might build up to threaten the stability and perhaps the very existence of the régime. The greatest danger seemed to be in the army, where many junior officers were bitter about the incompetence of their commanders, and the rank and file with the cowardice of many of their officers during the fighting. Only swift action by the King in court-martialling the cowards and sacking the incompetents seemed likely to retain the army's loyalty. We believed, too, that the re-equipment of the army and the air force was a pressing need if the officers were not to turn sour. So far as we know, no one in the army has been court-martialled, although four Royal Jordanian Air Force pilots were dismissed for alleged cowardice at the end of the war. There have been no premature retirements, and the most that has been done is to reshuffle some

commanders and staff officers in the army. Re-equipment of the army has hardly begun and until the 9th of September, when three RAF Hunters were flown in Jordanian colours to Amman from Khormaksar, the RJAF had only one operational Hunter. Yet all the indications are that the King and his senior officers can still count on the loyalty of the armed forces and at present public security is good.

5. The influx of over 200,000 refugees from the West Bank, together with the reduction in Jordan's economy through the country being split in half, seemed to us at the time likely to create unbearable problems for the régime. Indeed, the early handling of the refugees and the continuing inertia of the Ministries concerned with the economy was deplorable. Despite this, there is no widespread economic distress: the shops are full, there is ample food and the refugees and other displaced persons from the West Bank, now that UNRWA has assumed responsibility for most of them, are being cared for. The good weather and the abundant fruit and vegetable crops coming over from the West Bank with the tacit consent of the Israelis while a wide range of consumer goods and cigarettes is being smuggled the other way, have combined to mitigate distress among the poorer sections of the community. Contributions from Her Majesty's Government and other countries for relief, rehabilitation and development have helped provide funds for labour intensive projects. But in this field too, the Jordan Government have not measured up to their difficulties. The enclosed note(1) illustrates some of the economic problems to be solved and the Government's failure to match up to its responsibilities. There is no "economic" overlord and the Keynesian policies of the Minister of National Economy are frustrated in the Cabinet by the orthodox financial arguments of the Minister of Finance. Jordan's reserves now stand at some £94 million, to which a further £10 million will be added on the 15th of October if the pledging countries at the Arab Summit keep their promise to pay the first quarterly instalment of the £40 million contribution to Jordan. This £104 million represents almost two years' imports at 1966 levels, *i.e.*, for a united Jordan. Yet, so far, none of these reserves has been committed to development schemes. Aid givers are surely going to look hard at the logic of making funds available to a country with unemployed financial reserves of this magnitude.

6. Politically there have been no serious differences between the régime and the people in the past three months. The policy of strengthening Jordan's ties with other Arab States, of explaining her difficulties and drumming up support has had everyone's approval. Relations with the West Bank and public pronouncements by the King and the Government have not so far inclined West Bank "separatists" to look very seriously for association with Israel, rather than an eventual return to a unified Jordan. But this is potentially the most dangerous of Jordan's problems. The longer Israeli occupation continues the greater the danger (according to Tel Aviv telegram No. 1012 to the Foreign Office) of West Bankers opting for some sort of association with Israel, as a means of ending Israeli military occupation. Reunification with Jordan must in my view soon be shown to be a likely alternative if practical advantages, combined with Israeli pressures and disillusionment with Arab ineffectiveness, are not to work in favour of some formal accommodation between the West Bank and Israel.

7. Many of the former dangers to the régime have for the present evaporated in the new phase of Arab co-operation and brotherliness. However, the policy of Syria and Algeria is a reminder that the Khartoum Summit did not achieve complete Arab Unity. Nor on past form are the Arabs themselves likely for long to act as if even the impact of Israel's victory had permanently removed their mutual differences and hostility to each other. If no satisfactory settlement with Israel is forthcoming within the foreseeable future, we should not be surprised if the Arabs once more turn in on themselves and resume their internecine warfare. But in the meantime King Hussein should be free from effective, revolutionary Arab attacks on his position—unless Syria, as the odd man out, decides once more to work for the end of the Hashemite régime. King Hussein, however, is being cautious and has not so far thought the situation sufficiently safe, or the likely advantages enough, for him to negotiate first and separately with Israel. His instinct in this is probably right; he does not wholly trust his Arab peers' agreement

(1) Not printed.

for him to go ahead and negotiate with Israel for the return of his lost territories, in advance of a general settlement. Nor does he wish to go down in history as the Arab monarch who "betrayed" the cause of Palestine by initiating negotiations with the Israelis. I believe King Hussein will wish to see what emerges from the United Nations before deciding whether he should "go it alone". If no satisfactory solution came out of the United Nations, then the King might think he was justified in entering into negotiations with Israel for the return of his lost territories. There is also the possibility that King Hussein might throw in his hand rather than do this. He probably realises that Arab leaders are as yet ahead of their people in appreciating the need for negotiations rather than embarking on another disastrous war with Israel. Having fed their people on a diet of fantastic propaganda, especially regarding Israel, over the past 20 years at least, Arab leaders cannot now overnight repudiate the line they have peddled and hope to retain the support of the masses. Some time would have to be allowed for re-education and for the Arab people to be brought to see the facts of the present situation. King Hussein's concern not to get too far out in front therefore probably outweighs any faith he may have in the thesis that he would get better terms from Israel the sooner he starts to negotiate.

8. In deciding his course of action the King will undoubtedly have in mind the vital importance of getting his timing right. While the United Nations are in play he may calculate that Israel will not further alienate opinion there by any irrevocable action over the West Bank. He must feel sure of his army—he has been more absent from Jordan since the war (as has his Chief of Staff) than anyone with doubts about the loyalty of his army would dared to have been. He appears to have been reassured about the loyalty of West Bankers. He knows his people will not starve, so he probably considers that he can and should await the outcome of the United Nations discussions before deciding what he will do about talks with Israel.

9. In the absence of a general Arab-Israel settlement, and until the resources of the United Nations have been exhausted, including perhaps the appointment of a United Nations mediator or Secretary-General's Special representative, it looks, therefore, as if Jordan-Israel negotiations over the return of the West Bank and Jerusalem will not get started. Britain's best hope of helping Jordan lies through the United Nations and, as we have decided with the Americans that the maintenance of a moderate Jordan is still in our interests, our efforts there should presumably be directed to securing the minimum terms which will help to ensure the continued existence of a unified Jordan. In other words we must support those who demand the return of the West Bank and Jerusalem to Jordan. Meanwhile we should continue our careful and valuable contributions, including advice on policy, towards keeping Jordan economically afloat within the limits of her present frontiers.

10. An East Bank Jordan could in theory be made "viable" in time by massive injections of foreign aid, as the enclosed economic summary(1) by Mr. Hudson of the Middle East Development Division shows; but it is doubtful whether in the long term this would be worthwhile. A rump Transjordan—that is with the West Bank indefinitely lost—would be a depressingly insignificant State. As regards its human resources, how many Palestinians, who have so far provided most of the business and technical skills, would wish to live on in a State whose economic and political future as a second Transjordan seemed so uncertain? Already this Embassy is receiving a flood of applications from young Palestinians from the East Bank as well as from Gaza and the West Bank who wish to emigrate to Canada, Australia and the Arab States of the Gulf. This seems a bad augury for a State already desperately short of competent executives. Nor can one rule out that as a result of Israeli policy Transjordan might eventually find itself saddled permanently with an additional 300,000–400,000 refugees from Gaza and the West Bank.

11. What sort of political figure would such a State cut? What sort of weight would be given to its advice in inter-Arab councils? Would King Hussein consent to rule over such a rump? He has said privately that he would not. More to the point, would the Jordanians continue to acknowledge a King who not only had lost the war, but lost the peace as well? It would be well here to note a general opinion among professional

(1) Not printed.

Jordanians in Amman: that the present Government is bungling affairs, while Ministers line their pockets and the King's uncle and the former Prime Minister, [redacted]njat Talhouni, are said to be making a fortune out of refugees' rations. This disillusionment could in time spread to the young army officers, whose background in many cases is similar to that of their contemporaries in business. If that were to happen, the country's sheet anchor would be lost and with it the present régime.

12. It would be wise, therefore, to recognise that, especially in the absence of any wider Arab-Israel settlement, Jordan's situation is likely to continue to be very precarious for some time to come. If a moderate Jordan is to survive action will be required in the short term to see that political and economic incompetence, despair and subversion do not over the next few months eat into the fabric of the State and bring it down. The longer-term problem is to get the best terms possible from Israel, which if pressures on the King are not eventually to become intolerable, would have to include the return of most of the West Bank.

13. There will have to be wide support in helping Jordan over the next year. Britain cannot successfully act alone. We have not for more than a decade been able on our own to "carry" Jordan and the major burden must be borne by others. However, as one of the major aid givers we should seek to persuade the United States Government that in present circumstances it is not narrow considerations of orthodox aid procedures which should prevail in discussions about what Jordan requires. It would be wise, also to engage the interest of other NATO countries in support of Jordan (and our other Middle Eastern friends) in these difficult days. On the other hand, in her own interests Jordan must be brought to take a realistic view of her economic problems. If the Administration here is either unwilling or unable to accept advice about getting through the economic difficulties of the future, or if sectional and private interests are allowed to intrude, then King Hussein should be left in no doubt about the dangers to his own position arising from the shortcomings of his Ministers and advisers. We have all too often in the past few months had examples of the sheer incapacity of the present Administration to grapple with the problems created by the war.

14. In the international sphere Britain should use her influence to get the best deal possible for Jordan. We must recognise that without the return of the West Bank the political future of the régime and the very existence of a moderate Jordan will be in grave peril. The Arabs, if they care for a moderate Jordan, must be prepared to pay the price, not only by financial support, but also in political sacrifices which Israel may insist on. At their lowest these would include an ending of belligerency. If for internal political reasons some Arab States cannot yet go this far they should at least explicitly acknowledge that Jordan's is a special case and that failing a wider Arab-Israel settlement Jordan must herself decide whether or not, in order to survive, she must come to terms with the victor. Any less help to Jordan from her Arab sister States should be taken as a measure of their real concern for Jordan's survival in the moderate camp.

15. These are depressing thoughts, especially when one considers the hopes for a wider and more lasting Arab-Israel settlement which the recent war seemed to raise in the immediate aftermath of Israel's victory. Developments since then, and the increasing rigidity of Israel on the one hand and the frightened immobility of Arab leaders on the other, make one wonder whether there really is any chance at present of doing more than struggle for a *modus vivendi* in the area, which will leave unsolved many of the pre and post-war differences between the parties involved. Of course, much will depend on the durability of current Arab solidarity and the success of moderate Arab leaders in educating the Arab masses, after 20 years of phoney history, in the realities of power politics in the 20th century. We have witnessed Arab honeymoons before and the bitter quarrels which have invariably succeeded them. I think, therefore, we need to give more time for recent Arab initiatives—and they have been as dramatic as any in the past decade —to prove whether anyone in the Arab world has turned over a new leaf or whether the wheel will come again full circle, leaving the Arabs in disarray and Israel that much stronger.

16. Israel, herself, would do well to consider whether her increasingly rigid attitude on such points as the return of refugees and of territory, and on the question of Jerusalem as regards Islam, will in the long run be in her own best interests. While one can appreciate the argument that

a victor in such a war as that seen by Israel to have been provoked by the Arabs against her, has every justification in insisting on peace on her terms, there is much to be said in the present circumstances for looking beyond the immediate future. Israel's national security certainly requires a minimum of guarantees and concessions from the Arabs and she has the right to hold out for these. But her leaders would do well to consider what sort of legacy of bitterness and revenge may be left, if they exact too high a price from the Arabs. They would also do well to play along, for a while at least, to see whether the success of the moderate Arabs at Khartoum really means that in their heart of hearts Nasser, Aref and other Arab leaders, including Hussein, know that they must revise their policies towards Israel and prepare public opinion for a *volte face*. However disappointing the final communiqué may have been for Israel, the moderates achieved far more than anyone had a right to expect. Is Israel's security for only 5 or 10 years, at the price of massive rearmament and increasingly expensive weapons, to be preferred to a more permanent settlement worked out over a period of months, even perhaps years, which embraces the recognition of Israel and the ending of belligerency? In the case of Jordan, the return of the West Bank (with minor frontier rectifications), concessions over the return of refugees, and a willingness to discuss the future of Jerusalem would at least seem reasonable, in return for a lengthy peace on Israel's long eastern border.

17. We are told that Israel is not much interested in the survival of the Hashemite régime, and dismisses the argument that the Hashemites offer the best chance of a moderate State on Israel's eastern front. But it is difficult to believe that even the " hard-liners " and the " hawks " in Israel would welcome a campaign of sabotage, subversion and resistance on the West Bank of Jordan; or a long series of raids and retaliation across the Jordan. Such campaigns have a habit over the years of evolving into something which punitive raids and reprisals cannot contain, *e.g.*, Algeria and Viet-Nam. This, however, is what they should expect if King Hussein is indefinitely refused the minimum terms on which he could negotiate. While the King is seen to be active in seeking help for Jordan and until the disillusionment and misery of the refugee camps spreads to the public at large, he is probably safe enough. But if there is no sign of a return of Jordan's lost territories, and with them the possibility of the refugees going home, criticism of the régime will mount and the temptation and justification for a *coup d'état* to replace an ineffective monarch by a military junta will become almost irresistible. No one should suppose that such a junta would in time be able to " deliver " more that the King could. Thus would begin a cycle of *coups* and insurrections so familiar in neighbouring Syria. It is significant that there are already among Jordan's more responsible and solid political and military leaders those who advocate guerilla warfare on the West Bank, despite the repression this would entail there, simply because they see no other way of containing the mounting frustrations of the Jordanian people. They have no illusions about the hopelessness of such a course, but they consider it more honourable and supportable than supine acceptance of defeat, with no respectable settlement.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Beirut, Jedda, Bahrain, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, United Kingdom Mission, New York, and to Her Majesty's Consul-General in Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

P. G. D. ADAMS.

Reference EJ 1/16.

(2)

MODEV Telegram No. 175
to Amman of 20 Sept 1967

Transferred to EJ 6/36

Ed (4206)

Reference EJ 1/16 (3)

WTON Telegram No. 3057
of 26 Sept 1967

Transferred to EJ 6/36

Ed (4206)

(4)

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15
24 JAN 1968
EJ 1/16

CONFIDENTIAL

Summary of Amman Despatch of the 22nd of January, 1968:

Jordan in the Doldrums

King Hussein's task in keeping Jordan "on course" towards a peaceful settlement is getting progressively more difficult. The apparent lack of any substantial progress through Mr. Jarring towards the recovery of the West Bank and Jerusalem is creating a mood of despair and disillusionment. The postponement of the Arab Summit meeting may, on balance, make the King's task easier. (Paras. 1-3).

2. The King's major pre-occupation is the maintenance of morale in his armed forces. This, he believes, requires their re-equipment with modern offensive arms as soon as possible. He hopes that the United States' decision to resume arms supplies to Jordan may enable him to hold the position while his Chief of Staff negotiates in Washington. The decision came in the nick of time to save him from having to accept a Soviet military delegation and probably Soviet arms. The King may yet have to turn to King Feisal to finance his arms' purchases from the West. Meanwhile he has tried to protect his flank from U.A.R. sniping by securing Nasser's consent to his negotiating for the return of what he has lost. (Paras. 4-7).

3. The situation on the home front is not encouraging. The King's grip on affairs appears to be loosening in the face of growing discontent and the accumulation of problems. There is a discernible deterioration in

law and order. Against this background the Soviet Union is not idle. There is a "new look" to Jordan-Soviet relations, typified by the visit of an economic delegation and the Soviet desire to supply Jordan with arms. Jordanian security services seem dangerously indifferent to these new manifestations, perhaps because of their disenchantment with the United States. (Paras. 8-9).

4. The King can, in the face of these varied threats, no longer hope to keep Jordan on an even keel by his "personal diplomacy". To preserve his own position he will need all his famous courage and a lot of luck. It is to be hoped that he does not prejudice his long-term chances by the measures he judges necessary to enable him to survive the next few months. (Paras. 10 & 11).

5. The long period of waiting and inaction on the home front may be drawing to a close. If King Hussein makes a wrong decision now he could lose everything, since he will be more vulnerable now than ever to attacks from within his own country and from Jordan's Arab ill-wishers e.g. Syria. If Israel really wants a settlement she would do well to give King Hussein a chance to reach a political settlement. Her Majesty's Government should remain ready to respond to any request for political support, whether in the United Nations or with Israel, to enable Jordan to achieve a settlement. (Para. 12).

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN.
22 January, 1968.

(1/2)

Sir,

Jordan in the Doldrums

Recent developments in Jordan, taken with the lack of any visible progress so far by Mr. Jarring to bring about the first essential steps towards that "just and lasting peace in the Middle East" for which the Security Council has called, make King Hussein's task of preserving stability in Jordan even more difficult than usual. In this despatch I have the honour to survey the present situation and draw attention to these difficulties.

2. Jordanian hopes were at first pinned on Mr. Jarring's implementing the Security Council Resolution. Jordanians as a whole tended to wait rather passively for Mr. Jarring to bring about an early Israeli withdrawal and the deliverance of the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem. Palestinians especially seemed to expect this, but while they are those principally concerned they are not the most clear-headed or balanced of Arabs.

3. Many Jordanian officials and politicians also looked to the proposed Arab Summit meeting at Rabat to endorse the "moderate" line adopted at Khartoum and some hoped the meeting would give the King that additional assurance which he seemed to think he needed to work for the recovery of the West Bank, either through Mr. Jarring or separately. But the King

/and

The Right Honourable
George Brown, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

and some of his advisers were alive to the disadvantages of the Summit preceding Mr. Jarring's efforts to find a solution. They feared that the Arabs would want to strike new and bellicose attitudes for the record, although they believed the moderates would in the end carry the day, as they had at Khartoum. But they realise that however moderate the line they might succeed in getting adopted at the Summit, it would be bound to appear to Israel as more extreme than the moderates intended. With the renewal of tension over the Yemen, they have now begun to doubt whether in fact the moderates would stick together sufficiently to be able to dominate a Summit Conference in the foreseeable future.

4. The King was also concerned at the account he could give at the Summit of Jordan's military re-equipment. It was believed that new life was to be given to the United Arab Command and that Jordan would be asked for a report on the state of her armed forces. As His Majesty told me on the 28th of December last, he felt himself being squeezed into a corner: the United States Government had given no indication of their intention to lift their embargo on arms supplies for Jordan and the Soviet Government had announced the arrival in Amman on the 5th of January of a delegation comprising economic and military experts. At the same time, according to King Hussein, his officers were beginning to doubt his ability to procure the arms and aircraft required to make them an effective fighting force. The American

/intimation

CONFIDENTIAL

intimation to the King that the embargo was to be lifted came in the nick of time and General Khammash is now in Washington to discuss requirements. Pressure was also eased by the Soviet acquiescence, unwillingly given, not to send military experts for the time being. But the dangers inherent in this situation continue and will become real if the United States decide they cannot meet Jordan's request for offensive weapons including tanks.

5. The postponement of the Summit - the reason for which is believed, at least in Amman, to stem from the deterioration of the situation in the Yemen, and a consequent rift in the uneasy Arab solidarity which was momentarily achieved at the Khartoum Summit - and the disappointing progress made by Mr. Jarring impelled the King to undertake another of his flying visits, this time to King Feisal and President Nasser.

6. In Riyadh, we are told, King Hussein at least got some reassurances from King Feisal, who apparently urged him not to take Russian arms, even if the Americans disappointed him, but to return to Riyadh before he finally made up his mind. This would seem to confirm Feisal's real concern about Soviet penetration here and his determination to do what he can to prevent Jordan slipping into the Soviet net.

7. In Cairo, where the King found Nasser in poor shape, he seems to have secured agreement to Jordan pursuing an independent line, if it proved necessary

/with

CONFIDENTIAL

with regard to negotiations with Israel (either through Mr. Jarring or separately) for the return of the West Bank and Jerusalem. Despite this re-assurance, however, we know that King Hussein continues to mistrust Nasser, but believes he must take risks as time is running out for Jordan.

8. At home the King's grip appears to be loosening. Talhouni's Government is disliked, inefficient and increasingly corrupt. There is growing discontent among the refugees, the army and Palestinians at the King's lack of success so far in getting back anything of what he lost. The economy of the country is patently running down and merchants are frustrated and resentful. All this seems to be contributing to an increasing disregard for authority and growing lawlessness, which are discernible not only within Jordan but on the frontiers.

9. Against this background the Soviet Government is not idle. Quite apart from official visits and the activities of their economic delegation at present here, the Soviets are increasing their penetration of the Trades Unions. Known Jordanian Communists have returned from exile to resume their business in Jordan. A disturbing feature of the official Jordanian attitude to the Soviet economic delegation is the apparent complacent disinterest of the security services. This may stem from the very strong personal feeling of some officials that the U.S. Government has let Jordan (and

/the

the Arabs) down over the years, and has thus opened the door to Soviet Russia. They argue that it is not their fault "if the Soviets now come in and scoop the pool". But it seems likely that the U.S.S.R. will for the time being at least remain content to consolidate their bridge-head in Jordan and will not provoke any sudden change. I would not expect any dramatic development unless the King finally decided that his survival required the re-arming of his country and that this could only be done adequately at the price of accepting Russian arms. This would, I believe, be a watershed.

10. It is clear that the situation is steadily worsening for the King who can no longer hope to keep Jordan on an even keel by his "personal diplomacy" alone. There are too many interlocking factors: Israeli intentions regarding a settlement: Nasser's intentions, not only regarding a settlement but towards Hussein; the economic/political developments which have deprived Jordan of her traditional American and British support (albeit in exchange for temporary Arab aid) on the scale to which she had become accustomed, at a time when her appetite for military "hard-ware" has increased; the uncertain ambitions of the Palestinians in their new situation since the Arab-Israel war; the active hostility of Syria to Jordan; the burden of a shattered economy, and an additional quarter of a million refugees.

/11.

CONFIDENTIAL

11. While it is true that past crises have led observers from time to time to "write off" the Hashemites, only to see the King emerge, Houdini-like, from hopeless situations, the King this time will need a lot of luck in addition to his famous courage, if he is to steer a safe course through the next few months. I hope he will not feel obliged to do things now, e.g. accept Soviet arms, in order to get over his immediate difficulties, which might prejudice his future and that of the country.

12. The fact that there are now choices of action open to the King indicates that the period of waiting and stalemate may perhaps be drawing to a close. Given the absence of any unanimous Arab agreement about the next step, or about the desirability of a peaceful solution, the King will inevitably be playing a dangerous hand in pursuing his aim of reaching a political settlement. Many of his own people will be against him and some of his neighbours will continue deliberately to embroil Jordan with Israel. Israel's own interests might well be served by a more tolerant attitude to Jordan. If Israel really wants a settlement, she should give King Hussein a chance to achieve one on terms which would not seem inevitably to lead to his own destruction. In these circumstances the King will look for continued support from the West, including Britain on whose political influence in the United Nations and with Israel he and his advisers rely.

CONFIDENTIAL

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's representatives at Washington, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Bahrein, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, U.K. Mission, New York, and to Her Majesty's Consul-General in Jerusalem.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

J. P. Tripp

(J. P. Tripp)
H. M. Chargé d'Affaires

CONFIDENTIAL

Conf. Reference EJ1/16. (5)

Submission

A. R. Moore 22/2

Mr. Moore
Mr. Moberly
Mr. Rich
Mr. Saunders
Mr. Daly
Mr. Alston
Mr. Beamish
Mr. Makins
Mr. Montgomery
Mr. Davies

Reference EJ 1/16

Confidential

Mr Roberts -

Amman Despatch of 22/1/68.

I consider this despatch should be printed for FO/CO/WH distribution, and have prepared a copy accordingly. I recommend priority printing.

I recommend that an advance copy should be circulated to Mr Roberts, Mr P.V.S and Sir D. Allen.

The despatch highlights the precarious position of the Hashemite Régime which must constantly balance internal pressures with those from Israeli ~~and~~ encroachment, a number of potentially false Arab friends, Britain and the U.S and now the Soviet Union. The key line of the despatch is in para 12. "If Israel really wants a settlement, she should give King Hussein a chance to achieve one on terms which would not seem inevitably to lead to his own destruction".

[signature] 24/1

Mr Daly

I have sent this dispatch for printing FO/WO(Q)/WH distribution and I have submitted a second copy to Mr Moon for submission to Under-Secretaries. NEAD, Northern Dept and Austrian Dept should see.

J. cm.
25-i

Room 272

Pse circulate in Dept
Same to Mr Moore Mr Mobsley
& Mr Thom to NEAD, Northern
Austrian Dept.

Mr Sullenbarger 21/2
Mr Weir
Mr Eyers 21/2.

ARCHIVES COPY.
NOT FOR CIRCULATION

JORDAN IN THE DOLDRUMS

Mr. Tripp to Mr. Brown. (*Received 24 January*)

SUMMARY

King Hussein's task in keeping Jordan " on course " towards a peaceful settlement is getting progressively more difficult. The apparent lack of any substantial progress through Mr. Jarring towards the recovery of the West Bank and Jerusalem is creating a mood of despair and disillusionment. The postponement of the Arab Summit Meeting may, on balance, make the King's task easier. (Paragraphs 1–3.)

2. The King's major pre-occupation is the maintenance of morale in his armed forces. This, he believes, requires their re-equipment with modern offensive arms as soon as possible. He hopes that the United States' decision to resume arms supplies to Jordan may enable him to hold the position while his Chief of Staff negotiates in Washington. The decision came in the nick of time to save him from having to accept a Soviet military delegation and probably Soviet arms. The King may yet have to turn to King Feisal to finance his arms' purchases from the West. Meanwhile he has tried to protect his flank from UAR sniping by securing Nasser's consent to his negotiating for the return of what he has lost. (Paragraphs 4–7.)

3. The situation on the home front is not encouraging. The King's grip on affairs appears to be loosening in the face of growing discontent and the accumulation of problems. There is a discernible deterioration in law and order. Against this background the Soviet Union is not idle. There is a " new look " to Jordan-Soviet relations, typified by the visit of an economic delegation and the Soviet desire to supply Jordan with arms. Jordanian security services seem dangerously indifferent to these new manifestations, perhaps because of their disenchantment with the United States. (Paragraphs 8–9.)

4. The King can, in the face of these varied threats, no longer hope to keep Jordan on an even keel by his " personal diplomacy ". To preserve his own position he will need all his famous courage and a lot of luck. It is to be hoped that he does not prejudice his long-term chances by the measures he judges necessary to enable him to survive the next few months. (Paragraphs 10–11.)

5. The long period of waiting and inaction on the home front may be drawing to a close. If King Hussein makes a wrong decision now he could lose everything, since he will be more vulnerable now than ever to attacks from within his own country and from Jordan's Arab ill-wishers, *e.g.*, Syria. If Israel really wants a settlement she would do well to give King Hussein a chance to reach a political settlement. Her Majesty's Government should remain ready to respond to any request for political support, whether in the United Nations or with Israel, to enable Jordan to achieve a settlement. (Paragraph 12.)

(Confidential) *Amman,*
Sir, *22 January, 1968.*

Recent developments in Jordan, taken with the lack of any visible progress so far by Mr. Jarring to bring about the first essential steps towards that " just and lasting peace in the Middle East " for which the Security Council has called, make King

20500—33 8530—71

Hussein's task of preserving stability in Jordan even more difficult than usual. In this despatch I have the honour to survey the present situation and draw attention to these difficulties.

2. Jordanian hopes were at first pinned on Mr. Jarring's implementing the Security Council Resolution. Jordanians as a whole tended to wait rather passively for Mr. Jarring to bring about an early Israeli withdrawal and the deliverance of the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem. Palestinians especially seemed to expect this, but while they are those principally concerned they are not the most clear-headed or balanced of Arabs.

3. Many Jordanian officials and politicians also looked to the proposed Arab Summit Meeting at Rabat to endorse the " moderate " line adopted at Khartoum and some hoped the meeting would give the King that additional assurance which he seemed to think he needed to work for the recovery of the West Bank, either through Mr. Jarring or separately. But the King and some of his advisers were alive to the disadvantages of the Summit preceding Mr. Jarring's efforts to find a solution. They feared that the Arabs would want to strike new and bellicose attitudes for the record, although they believed the moderates would in the end carry the day, as they had at Khartoum. But they realise that however moderate the line they might succeed in getting adopted at the Summit, it would be bound to appear to Israel as more extreme than the moderates intended. With the renewal of tension over the Yemen, they have now begun to doubt whether in fact the moderates would stick together sufficiently to be able to dominate a Summit Conference in the foreseeable future.

4. The King was also concerned at the account he could give at the Summit of Jordan's military re-equipment. It was believed that new life was to be given to the United Arab Command and that Jordan would be asked for a report on the state of her armed forces. As His Majesty told me on the 28th of December last, he felt himself being squeezed into a corner: the United States Government had given no indication of their intention to lift their embargo on arms supplies for Jordan and the Soviet Government had announced the arrival in Amman on the 5th of January of a delegation comprising economic and military experts. At the same time, according to King Hussein, his officers were beginning to doubt his ability to procure the arms and aircraft required to make them an effective fighting force. The American intimation to the King that the embargo was to be lifted came in the nick of time and General Khammash is now in Washing[redacted] to discuss requirements. Pressure was also eased by the Soviet acquiescence, unwillingly given, not to send military experts for the time being. But the dangers inherent in this situation continue and will become real if the United States decide they cannot meet Jordan's request for offensive weapons including tanks.

5. The postponement of the Summit—the reason for which is believed, at least in Amman, to stem from the deterioration of the situation in the Yemen, and a consequent rift in the uneasy Arab solidarity which was momentarily achieved at the Khartoum Summit—and the disappointing progress made by Mr. Jarring impelled the King to undertake another of his flying visits, this time to King Feisal and President Nasser.

6. In Riyadh, we are told, King Hussein at least got some reassurances from King Feisal, who apparently urged him not to take Russian arms, even if the Americans disappointed him, but to return to Riyadh before he finally made up his mind. This would seem to confirm Feisal's real concern about Soviet penetration here and his determination to do what he can to prevent Jordan slipping into the Soviet net.

7. In Cairo, where the King found Nasser in poor shape, he seems to have secured agreement to Jordan pursuing an independent line, if it proved necessary with regard to negotiations with Israel (either through Mr. Jarring or separately) for the return of the West Bank and Jerusalem. Despite this re-assurance, however, we know that King Hussein continues to mistrust Nasser, but believes he must take risks as time is running out for Jordan.

8. At home the King's grip appears to be loosening. Talhouni's Government is disliked, inefficient and increasingly corrupt. There is growing discontent among the refugees, the army and Palestinians at the King's lack of success so far in getting back anything of what he lost. The economy of the country is patently running down and merchants are frustrated and resentful. All this seems to be contributing to an increasing disregard for authority and growing lawlessness, which are discernible not only within Jordan but on the frontiers.

9. Against this background the Soviet Government is not idle. Quite apart from official visits and the activities of their economic delegation at present here, the Soviets are increasing their penetration of trade unions. Known Jordanian Communists have returned from exile to resume their business in Jordan. A disturbing feature of the official Jordanian attitude to the Soviet economic delegation is the apparent complacent disinterest of the security services. This may stem from the very strong personal feeling of some officials that the United States Government has let Jordan (and the Arabs) down over the years, and has thus opened the door to Soviet Russia. They argue that it is not their fault " if the Soviets now come in and scoop the pool ". But it seems likely that the USSR will for the time being at least remain content to consolidate their bridge-head in Jordan and will not provoke any sudden change. I would not expect any dramatic development unless the King finally decided that his survival required the re-arming of his country and that this could only be done adequately at the price of accepting Russian arms. This would, I believe, be a watershed.

10. It is clear that the situation is steadily worsening for the King who can no longer hope to keep Jordan on an even keel by his " personal diplomacy " alone. There are too many interlocking factors: Israeli intentions regarding a settlement; Nasser's intentions, not only regarding a settlement but towards Hussein; the economic/political developments which have deprived Jordan of her traditional American and British support (albeit in exchange for temporary Arab aid) on the scale to which she had become accustomed, at a time when her appetite for military " hardware " has increased; the uncertain ambitions of the Palestinians in their new situation since the Arab-Israel war; the active hostility of Syria to Jordan; the burden of a shattered economy, and an additional quarter of a million refugees.

11. While it is true that past crises have led observers from time to time to " write off " the Hashemites, only to see the King emerge, Houdini-like, from hopeless situations, the King this time will need a lot of luck in addition to his famous courage, if he is to steer a safe course through the next few months. I hope he will not feel obliged to do things now, *e.g.*, accept Soviet arms, in order to get over his immediate difficulties, which might prejudice his future and that of the country.

12. The fact that there are now choices of action open to the King indicates that the period of waiting and stalemate may perhaps be drawing to a close. Given the absence of any unanimous Arab agreement about the next step, or about the desirability of a peaceful solution, the King will inevitably be playing a dangerous hand in pursuing his aim of reaching a political settlement. Many of his own people will be against him and some of his neighbours will continue deliberately to embroil Jordan with Israel. Israel's own interests might well be served by a more tolerant attitude to Jordan. If Israel really wants a settlement, she should give King Hussein a chance to achieve one on terms which would not seem inevitably to lead to his own destruction. In these circumstances the King will look for continued support from the West, including Britain on whose political influence in the United Nations and with Israel he and his advisers rely.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Bahrein, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, United Kingdom Mission, New York, and to Her Majesty's Consul-General in Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

J. P. TRIPP

(*Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires*).

CONFIDENTIAL

(10/1)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES
10 JUN 1968
EJ 1/16

British Embassy,
AMMAN.
23 May, 1968.

(6)

Dear Tony,

The Prospects for an Arab-Israeli Settlement

.... I think it is just worth sending you the enclosed record of a talk I had the other day with Anwar Nuseibeh, woolly as it is, because he represents a line which is critical of the establishment here by which we are apt to be over-influenced, and because the Israelis appear to have (or have had) hopes of using him either as a leader of a Palestine puppet state or as a go-between with King Hussein. He spoke to me openly of his meetings with Eshkol, Eban and other Israeli leaders.

2. The picture he gave of the prospects for a settlement were distinctly gloomy. There can be no military settlement, he argues, given the geography of the Arab world and the disparity in military skills of the Israelis and the Arabs. In other words, neither side is able to reduce the other to <u>total</u> defeat. I am inclined to agree with him; the confidence of the Israelis that they could "administer a crushing defeat on any possible combination of Arab forces in the foreseeable future" (para. 7 of Michael Hadow's letter 10/1 of 25 April to Denis Allen) may be justified; but as the present situation in the Middle East surely shows, the capacity to crush armies does not of itself enable conquerors to make peace.

3. Anwar is hardly more hopeful of a political solution since he argues that no Arab (not even Nasser) is capable of surviving negotiations with Israel leading to what in Arab eyes would be bound to be regarded as a humiliating conclusion. This point cannot be proved one way or the other short of experiment, but I think it only right to report increasing signs here that there might well be a sharp movement against the régime if King Hussein appeared to be going into negotiations without the support of public opinion and the explicit blessing of the Palestinians. This risk must apply to some extent to all the Arab régimes, who are inclined to ride roughshod over the Palestinians whose right to home and survival is, after all, the crux of the Arab side of the problem. I know that it has been our policy to do nothing to urge King Hussein towards negotiations sooner than he thinks wise himself; so long as we remain interested in his survival we must stick to this line.

/4.

A.R. Moore Esq., C.M.G.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN CLOSED UNDER
SECTION 5(1) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958 UNTIL 2009

4. I have also recently been over all this ground with Wasfi Tel. As you would imagine, he is still firmly opposed to any action to seek a political solution. But he has changed his tune since you and I saw him together in the autumn to the extent that he seems no longer to want to provoke the Israelis into over-extending and exposing themselves to "an Algerian-type" counter-attack. Now he says the only way to unite the Arabs is by sabre rattling and adopting a belligerent attitude. He professes to believe that if King Hussein gave the lead other Arab rulers would follow and the united armies of the Arab world could so range themselves as to give the Israelis pause; in those conditions the Arabs might face negotiations from a position of relative strength and could afford to risk war if the Israelis did not accept their terms. This seems to me totally unrealistic, but Wasfi was not to be shaken.

5. I had taken Billy McLean to see Wasfi; that evening we dined privately with Prince Hassan. He was in an unusually robust mood and was taking the line diametrically opposed to Wasfi's. He argued that the Arabs had wasted their energies and resources in the recent past by squabbling among themselves and refusing to face the fact of Israel. The leaders should now tell the fedayeen to go to hell and make a settlement with Israel. He would have agreed, I think, with Anwar Nuseibeh in arguing that the Arabs for their part have a good deal to offer and he would hope to get a fairly quick settlement so that they (and this applies, of course, particularly to Jordan) could get on with their economic and social development. Here for a moment seemed to be a sign of positive and constructive thought, but I fear that the Prince was influenced more by the idealism of Oxford than the hard facts of the Arab world.

6. What all this seems to add up to is that the Arabs are as usual hopelessly divided and undecided. But I think there may be a growing appreciation of the fact that the crunch cannot be far off; the majority of Jordanians are sick and tired of the state of non-war and non-peace in which we live. The foreign observer is bound to conclude, I think, that Arabs and Jews cannot, unfortunately, sort out the situation themselves. I say "unfortunately" because, I suppose, it is most unlikely that anybody else will do it for them.

/7.

7. If I am right, then we are in for a longish period of tension and, in due course, probably the further "round" of which both sides speak. Meanwhile it seems to us that Her Majesty's Government's efforts in the area will best be directed to keeping the Jarring Mission in being and in doing what we can to keep temperatures down. Recent experience seems to show that with comparative quiet on the frontier, the extremists in Jordan tend to lose ground. If either side is genuinely interested in working for a settlement, they have a part to play in keeping things quiet. I think we are still right to be chary of taking a lead which might expose us to the hostility of both sides without any compensating benefit to ourselves; and I was glad to see a reaffirmation, in paragraph 9 of the Secretary of State's Despatch VK 3/28 of 7 May to Cairo of our determination to avoid getting into the posture of a mediator between Israel and the Arab States.

Yours ever.

Peter.

(P.G.D. Adams)

Copied to:
H.E. Mr. R.M. Hadow, C.M.G., Tel Aviv
H.E. Sir Harold Beeley, K.C.M.G., Cairo
Sir Leslie Glass K.C.M.G., U.K.Mission, New York
A.B. Urwick Esq., Washington
J.H. Lewen Esq., Jerusalem.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

Anwar Nuseibeh, who was passing through Amman on his way from Abu Dhabi to Jerusalem, got in touch with me on 18 May to express hit gratitude for the various messages which had been sent to him about his family following their involvement in the Jerusalem demonstration.

2. I later had a long talk with him about the prospects for a settlement with Israel. He is of those whose thinking starts with a yearning for peace and a determination to see Arab Jerusalem restored to the Arabs, at some cost if need be. He said he supported the Jarring Mission despite its lack of progress to date because he felt no possibility of finding a way to a settlement could be overlooked. But frankly he doubted whether an honourable settlement could be reached by this means. The idea of striking a bargain with the Jews was still repugnant to Arab public opinion. He would never advise King Hussein to make peace with Israel alone, or even in association with Nasser. No Arab ruler or foreseeable combination of rulers was strong enough, he thought, to make peace with Israel without outside help. Any régime which tried would risk immediate overthrow and at the end of the day the Israelis would find themselves with no one with whom they could negotiate.

3. Anwar Nuseibeh had little positive to say about what should be done to get a settlement if his reading of the general situation was correct. He was much opposed to the attempt now being made in the Security Council to get a further resolution condemning Israel and to the drift towards calling for "further measures" which seemed to mean sanctions. Sanctions had been shown repeatedly to be a worthless weapon. But he wondered whether instead the United Nations could not be persuaded to think in terms of sending a force. Of course there would be Israeli and Arab objections. But unless some outside body were imposed upon them to hold the ring, as it were, they would never get down to meaningful negotiations.

(J Homan:

4. As to negotiations he was, of course, determined that these should not be confined to Israelis and Arabs; the Israelis seemed not to realise that, as he had explained earlier, any Arab who came to direct talks with them would immediately be disowned by his own people. The only way around this problem that he could see would be to work for the participation in the negotiations of members of the Security Council.

/5.

5. Nuseibeh was bitterly critical of the Nasserite policy of "removing the traces of aggression" which so many of the Arabs seemed to have accepted. Reconstruction of the status quo aute the 1967 war would be nonsensical. A settlement which would bring peace to the area would, he thought, have to include the full restoration of Arab rights in the whole of Palestine and Israeli acceptance of the right of refugees to return. He thought it might be easier for the Israelis to cede parts of the occupied territory if they were "to provide space for the settlement of refugees".

6. When challenged on the lack of realism in this line of thought Nuseibeh argued that the Arabs have a good deal to offer Israel. This included not only recognition, security, and the freedom of passage through waterways, but the opportunity to break out of the ghetto on the Mediterranean coastline which they had built for themselves and association with a vast area with which they could develop economic and cultural ties; the area could, in the long term, develop into a cohesive semitic bloc.

7. In the short term, Nuseibeh said that the Palestinians wanted to keep all their options open, but that their natural and most probable choice would be reassociation with the Hashemite kingdom. This would have to be on new terms, and as to the mistakes of the past, he thought the Palestinians were as much to blame as King Hussein and the Amman régime. He dismissed any form of separate Palestinian state except possibly in the sense of an area which would be placed under U.N. trusteeship during protracted negotiations.

8. On fedayeen Nuseibeh said first that they were a nuisance both to the Israelis and the West Bankers. However, he thought they were to be welcomed to the extent that they helped to maintain Arab morale and as providing a focus for "Arabism" which the régimes in the area had somehow failed to do. Perhaps their proper rôle would be as commando units of a regular army; this could not be for some time, but meanwhile we should remember that the best form of training is usually doing the job.

9. As to Jerusalem, Nuseibeh said that he and his friends were determined that its Arab character must be maintained; it would be a betrayal to leave now or to give in to Israeli coercion. The Arabs would settle for nothing less than the return to Arab control of the whole of East Jerusalem. They had no interest in a "special régime for the mosques".

(P.G.D. Adams)

21 May 1968.

RESTRICTED

(7).

June 11.vi
11 A= Hawley
2 A= Alt
3 E.M. 11/6
ARR
10.6

(2/1)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 13 JUN 1968

BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV.
5 June, 1968.

Dear Tony,

EJ1/16.

EJ1/16

Mr. Anwar Nuseibeh

In view of the discussion H.M. Ambassador in Amman had recently with Mr. Anwar Nuseibeh (reported in his letter (10/1) of 23 May to you), I enclose a translation of an interview which Mr. Nuseibeh gave to Ma'ariv on 3 June, i.e. shortly after his return to Jerusalem.

2. As you will see, nothing he said contradicted anything he said to Mr. Adams. However, he does seem to have made point of the following (perhaps because it was easier for him to talk about them in public, for fairly obvious reasons):-

(a) The Palestinians have the right to talk about everything concerning them.

(b) If Jordan is going to make an agreement, she should sign it openly.

(c) The Fatah would accept an Israel/Jordan agreement.

(d) All the Palestinians and the Fatah want a bi-national state of the kind Professor Judah Magnes advocated in his time.

3. Speaking very personally, I find 2(d) above interesting, mainly because I have not heard it from any other quarter.

4. Again, speaking personally, I wonder about 2(c).

Yours ever,
Keith Mandel.

(N. J. Mandel)

A. R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

c.c. with enc. Chancery, Amman
H.M. Con. Gen. Jerusalem.

Ma'ariv, 3 June

If Jordan wants an Agreement, She should make it openly

(by Hazi Carmel)

"The Palestinians have the right to express their opinion on every problem connected with them. I do not say this to you alone. I have said this also to King Hussein himself.

"I hate politics for their own sake. In my opinion, policy must be a means to an end and those who make it must keep the general good in sight.

"Question: Do you believe that Jordan will agree to begin negotiations with Israel in New York?

"Answer: I hope that Jordan will not make the mistake which she made in the time of King Abdullah. If Jordan comes to sign an agreement with Israel, she must do it in an open manner and not in secret. I do not think that Jordan will be interested in secret agreements. It seems to me that Israel is more interested in that in view of the public debates conducted in the Knesset.

"The Fattah are like your IZL [The Jewish terrorist organisation during the Mandate]. When your national institutions adopted in 1947 the resolution to accept the partition plan, the IZL accepted the resolution despite the fact that its basic position was entirely different (from the resolution). The Fattah also will accept the resolutions of the Arab countries and the majority of the Palestinians.

"In practice the Fattah demand what all the Palestinians demand - that they should be allowed to express their opinion in any arrangement affecting their fate. They demand this in a "militant" way but basically their demand is identical with that of the Palestinians in the West and East Banks. In essence and in principle, the principles of the Fattah are similar to the principles of the bi-national state of Magnes.

/"In my

"In my opinion, the Palestinians here should be allowed to express their opinion about the arrangements they want. But this is difficult to put into effect at present for technical reasons. The appropriate time and way must be found to bring the different opinions to expression. At the same time, it seems to me that Israel could do much, even if it were only by announcements as regards her intentions with respect to a peace settlement. Even an announcement in the Knesset could be of great value."

CONFIDENTIAL

RO (8)

EJ 1/16

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

8 July, 1968.

E4/3 (19)

6

We have read with great interest both your letter 10/1 of 23 May on the prospects for an Arab/Israeli settlement and your letter 4/1 of 7 June on the prospects for the recreation of a Palestine Arab Community. In broad terms we would accept your general impression that the Hourani plan does not offer much hope in the light of likely Israeli reactions, and that Nuseibeh's pessimism may well prove justified. Rather than pick out individual points from your letters it may be more helpful if I deal in fairly general terms with the conclusion to be drawn from some of the central issues which you raise, and the implications for our policies.

2. I seems unlikely, given the combination of Israeli technical skill and the realities of mid-twentieth century diplomacy, that the Arabs will, anyway for decades, be able to impose their will on the Palestine question militarily. On the other hand, despite her military skill and strength, Israel, although she may justifiably be confident of getting the better of any military encounter, cannot <u>impose</u> on the Arabs a settlement which will allow her to live on normal terms with them.

3. Although for reasons to which I will return it remains vital even in terms of immediate British interests to continue our efforts to promote agreement, it is increasingly difficult to challenge your contention that, in the short-term at least, the Arabs and Jews cannot sort out the situation themselves. In terms of attitudes on questions of substance it is the Israeli inability to define a national position which is at present freezing the situation, and despite Eban's and Rabin's realisation of the disadvantageous diplomatic position in which this leaves her, we should not rely on an early resolution of the very deep Cabinet divisions on this issue. But despite their apparently forthcoming immediate position it still remains to be demonstrated, as you point out, that King Hussein and President Nasser would in fact be able to survive, or more important calculate that they would be able to survive, the conclusion of a settlement with Israel on any terms which appear attainable especially on Jerusalem, however much they are in principle prepared to seek a political resolution of the problems outstanding following the June War.

/3. The

P.G.D. Adams, Esq., C.M.G.,
Amman.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. The Israeli position on direct negotiations ab initio does seem to have become a little more flexible in recent weeks but we must I think regard the demand for an ultimate contractual agreement binding on the Arabs as irreducible. If the Arab leaders do calculate that they could not accept the formal recognition of Israel which the conclusion of such an arrangement would imply, even as a final stage, we should be faced with the question of whether the U.S. could contemplate putting pressure on Israel to comply with an imposed settlement not incorporating a contractual and binding Israel-Arab arrangement of some kind. Harold Beeley's letter 2/4 of 14 June to Denis Allen, though he does not specifically deal with this point gives cause for some optimism that we may not reach this situation, and that Nasser might contemplate some formal ratification of a settlement drawn up indirectly, or at least with the participation of outside influences. If we did reach it however, I doubt whether the U.S. administration would be prepared, (or able in domestic political terms) to compel Israel to yield on this point, and if, as many on both sides including Dayan clearly expect, a settlement cannot be reached without external pressure a further lengthy period of stalemate would be in prospect. E2/48

4. Dayan himself seems to feel that in these circumstances the Palestine issue will solve itself in the sense that the Israeli occupation policies which he has developed will lead to the 'emergence' rather than the 'creation' of peace in the West Bank in that, While Israel's 'security border' remains on the Jordan, some form of political arrangement giving the Palestinians a large measure of self Government will be inevitable. Given the character of the Palestinians, and the lack of any sense of political identity at present, this line of argument is a plausible one - considerably more plausible and realistic it seems to me than the Hourani plan which has a similar objective, but would involve initial measures by Israel likely to be unacceptable to her. It does seem possible that against this background and that of the increasing efficiency of the Israeli 'cordon sanitaire' against infiltrators a sufficient measure of 'insulation' in respect of the West Bank proper might be built up to prevent it becoming the flashpoint for further conflict.

5. If this line of thinking is accepted, we can afford to take a reasonably long view of the West Bank problem taken in isolation. In many areas of the world we could with comparative equanimity take a similar long term view of the problem as a whole. Urgent as is the regional need for a settlement, this is not in itself a reason why we should be active in

/trying

trying to force the speed at which long term forces develop. Moreover, we could I think assume that the two super powers would wish to ensure that any further Middle East conflict did not escalate into a direct clash between them: there would anyway be little direct influence we could bring to bear on this process. The Washington Embassy commented aptly in another context recently that the one ground rule in their two player game on which both parties are firmly agreed is that there is no place in it for a referee. The trouble is that in the case of the Middle East direct British interests can be jeopardised in situations considerably less acute than those in which the interests of the super-powers are directly at risk. A sanctions resolution against Israel is a case in point; it would be embarrassing for the U.S., either to veto or ignore, but for us it might be disastrous. We therefore cannot afford merely to take the long view and let historical forces work themselves out. We are obliged to attempt to influence the situation both by actively working to promote a settlement, and by trying to secure super power involvement at a lower level than their own immediate interest would necessarily dictate, because if the situation cannot be kept within bounds it could quickly deteriorate with very damaging consequences for ourselves. Even if the consequences fall far short of a further general Arab-Israel war British economic interests either in Israel or in the Arab world, or both, would be likely once again to be endangered at a moment when our economic circumstances can least afford it. I will not spell out here all the potential 'flashpoints' but Israeli policy over Jerusalem, and a major clash in or seizure by Israel of territory on the eastern side of the Beit Shean valley are clearly two.

6. At the same time we do recognise that taking too forward a position can be just as damaging to our interests and it remains our policy to involve ourselves as little as possible. Nevertheless, we are likely to remain somewhat precariously balanced between disengagement and over-involvement - not because of any illusion over our own power to influence events, but because so much is at stake for us that we cannot afford to miss any realistic chance to influence events.

7. As you remarked of your own letters, there is little that is new in this, but your comments offered an occasion to re-examine the factors behind our own policies in a way which will I hope help to ensure

/that

that we on the one hand and you and the other posts primarily concerned on the other are thinking on similar lines. On the possible lines of a settlement our thinking has not deviated seriously from that embodied in Mr. Brown's despatch E 2/49 of 3 January to Lord Caradon.

(A.R. Moore)

c.c. R.M. Hadow, Esq., C.M.G.,
Tel Aviv.

Sir Harold Beeley, K.C.M.G., C.B.E.,
Cairo.

D.H.T. Hillyard, Esq.,
New York.

E.E. Tomkins, Esq., C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Washington.

E.E. Key, Esq.,
Jerusalem.

Registry No. E 4/3 EJ1/16

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

P.J. Adams, Esq., C.M.G.,
AMMAN.

From
A.I.R.M.
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department

c.c. FCO A

R. M. Hadow, Esq., C.M.G.
Tel Aviv. FCO B

Sir Harold Beeley, K.C.M.G., C.B.E.,
Cairo.

D. H. T. Hillyard, Esq.,
New York.

E.E. Tomkins, Esq., C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Washington.

E. E. Key, Esq.,
Jerusalem.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

W(B)L 51-7433

We have read with great interest both your letter 10/1 of 23 May on the prospects for an Arab/Israeli settlement and your letter 4/1 of 7 June on the prospects for the recreation of a Palestine Arab Community. In broad terms we would accept your general impression that the Hourani plan is ~~unlikely to~~ does not offer a ~~great deal~~ much hope in the light of Israeli reactions, and that Nuseibeh's ~~seems to us to talk a good deal of sense~~ pessimism may well prove justified. Rather than pick out individual points from your letters ~~for comment~~ it may be more helpful if I ~~highlight~~ list in fairly general terms the ~~possible consequences of~~ conclusions to be drawn from some of the central ~~points~~ issues which you raise, and their implications for our policies.

2. It seems unlikely, given the combination of Israeli technical skill and the realities of mid-twentieth century diplomacy, that the Arabs will ~~ever~~ anyway for decades be able to impose their will on the Palestine question militarily. On the other hand, despite her military skill and strength, Israel, although she may justifiably be confident of getting the better of any military encounter, cannot impose on the Arabs a settlement which will allow her to live on normal terms with them.

3. Although for reasons to which I will return it remains vital even in terms of immediate British interests to ~~sustain the attempt~~ continue our efforts to promote agreement, it is

/increasingly

increasingly difficult to challenge your contention that, in the short-term at least, the Arabs and Jews cannot sort out the situation themselves. In terms of attitudes on questions of substance it is the Israeli inability to define a national position which is at present ~~keeping open a significant gap between the two sides~~ freezing the situation, and despite Eban's and Rabin's ~~consciousness~~ realisation of the disadvantageous diplomatic position in which this leaves her, we should not rely on an early resolution of the very deep Cabinet divisions ~~in~~ on this ~~area~~ issue. But despite their apparently forthcoming immediate position it still remains to be demonstrated, as you ~~rightly~~ point out, that ~~they~~ King Hussein and President Nasser would in fact be able to survive, or more important calculate that they would be able to survive, the conclusion of a settlement with Israel, however much they are in principle prepared to seek a political resolution of the problems outstanding following the June war, ~~a little flexibility does seem to have entered into~~ the Israeli position on direct negotiations ab initio in recent weeks but we must I think regard the demand for an ultimate contractual ~~arrangement~~ agreement binding on the Arabs as irreducible. If the Arab leaders do calculate that they could not accept the formal recognition of Israel which the conclusion of such an arrangement would imply, even as a final stage, we should be faced with the question of whether the U.S. could contemplate putting pressure on Israel to comply with an imposed

/settlement

any terms which appear attainable especially on Jerusalem

No 3 //

does seem to have become a little more flexible

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Dd. 32855 Ed (4200)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

settlement not incorporating a contractual and binding Israel-Arab arrangement of some kind. Harold Beeley's letter 2/4 of 14 June to Denis Allen, though he does not specifically ~~analyse~~ deal with this point gives cause for some optimism that we may not reach this situation, and that Nasser might contemplate some formal ratification ~~at that stage~~ of a settlement drawn up indirectly, or at least with the participation of outside influences. If we did reach it however, I doubt whether the U.S. administration would be prepared (or able in domestic political terms) to ~~pressurise~~ compel Israel (to yield) on this point, and if, as many on both sides including Dayan clearly expect, a settlement cannot be reached without external pressure a further lengthy period of stalemate would be in prospect.

4. Dayan himself seems to feel that in these circumstances the Palestine issue will solve itself in the sense that the Israeli occupation policies which he has ~~created~~ developed will lead to the 'emergence' rather than 'creation' of peace in the West Bank to ~~an extent where~~ in that, while Israel's 'security border' remains on the Jordan, some form of political arrangement giving the Palestinians a large measure of self Government will be ~~possible~~ inevitable. Given the character of the Palestinians and the lack of any sense of political identity at present, this line of argument is a plausible one - considerably more plausible and realistic it seems to me than the Hourani plan which has a similar objective, but would involve initial measures by Israel ~~which~~ likely /~~would~~

likely to
~~would~~ be ~~totall~~y unacceptable to her. It does
possible
seem ~~likely~~ that against this background and
that of the increasing efficiency of the Israeli
'cordon sanitaire' against infiltrators ~~there is~~
a ~~reasonable chance that~~ in respect of the West
Bank proper a measure of 'insulation' ~~can be~~ might be
(supplement)
built up to prevent it becoming the flashpoint
for ~~of~~ further conflict. ~~tension.~~

5. If this line of thinking is accepted, we can afford to take a reasonably long view of the West Bank problem taken in isolation. In many areas of the world we could with comparative equanimity take a similar long term view of the problem as a whole. Urgent as is the regional need for a settlement, this is not in itself a
we should be active in trying to
reason why ~~our policy should be directed~~ to
~~attempting to~~ force the speed ~~with~~ at which long
Moreover
term forces develop. ~~In addition~~ we could I think assume that the two super powers would wish to ensure that any further Middle East conflict did not escalate into a direct clash between them: there would anyway be little direct influence we could bring to bear on this process. The Washington Embassy commented aptly in another context recently that the one ground
both parties
note in their two player game on which ~~they~~ are firmly agreed is that there is no place in it for a referee. The trouble ~~of course~~ is that in the case of the Middle East direct
can be
British interests ~~are~~ jeopardised in situations
(less acute than
~~which fall~~ considerably ~~short of~~ the ~~temperature~~ one
the
at ~~in~~ which ~~super-power~~ interests are directly at
(of the super-powers

/risk

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Ddt 32855 Ed (4200)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

risk. A sanctions resolution against Israel is a case in point; it would be embarrassing for the U.S., ~~potentially~~ disastrous. ~~for us.~~

either to veto or ignore but for us it might be

~~The general result is that even leaving aside for the moment such political factors as the pro Israeli lobby in the U.~~K. We/cannot ~~allow~~/to take the long view and let historical forces work themselves out. We are obliged to attempt to ~~force these processes~~ both ~~in the sense of~~ actively ~~trying~~ to ~~achieve~~ a settlement, and ~~of~~ trying to secure super power involvement at a lower level than their own immediate interest dictates, because if we do not, or do not ~~succeed,~~ there are several 'flashpoints' even ~~excluding the West Bank, which could erupt.~~

Even if the consequences ~~of this~~ fall far short of a further general Arab-Israel war British economic interests either in Israel or in the Arab world, or both, are likely once again to be endangered at a moment when our economic circumstances can least afford it. I will not spell out here all the potential 'flashpoints' but Israeli policy over Jerusalem and a major clash in or seizure by Israel of territory ~~by~~ on the eastern side of the Beit Shean valley are clearly two. ~~which could lead to the kind of embarrassment I have mentioned.~~

Last A-B →

6. As ~~with~~ your own letters, there is little ~~which~~ is new in this but your comments offered an ~~opportunity~~ to re-~~state~~ the factors behind our own policies in a way which will I hope help to ensure that we on the one hand and you and

/the

the other posts primarily concerned on the other are thinking on similar lines. On the possible lines of a settlement our thinking has not deviated sensibly from that embodied in Mr Bowis's despatch E 2/49 of 3 January to Lord Canada.

ARM.
8.1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.	DRAFT	Type 1 +
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	To:—	From
Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.		Telephone No. & Ext. Department
PRIVACY MARKING		
In Confidence		

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WIB'L 51-7433

A

& As the issue line we do require that raising too forward a position ~~where towards~~ ~~do not justify~~ it can be just as damaging to our interests. ~~Does warrant the reason for the~~ policy of disengagement to which we tried to adhere in the Middle East between 1959 and 1967, and which while possible we will try to follow. In May '67 we followed a more ~~forward~~ forward policy because we believed that circumstances were leading to an Arab/Israel war which might be catastrophic for British interests, and lead both to a great power confrontation and to irreparable damage to Israel. In the event Israel escaped unscathed and the great power confrontation, but, despite our efforts, our interests were gravely damaged. Then as now we were

and it remains our policy to ~~in order~~ ourselves in a little as possible. Nevertheless ~~we are~~ ~~to remain~~ somewhat precariously balanced between ~~disengagement~~ disengagement and

~~balanced precariously on a~~
~~tightrope between disengagement~~
and over involvement – not
because of any illusion over
our own power to influence events,
but because so much is ab
for us
Rather that we cannot afford to
realistic chance
miss any ~~possible~~ ~~more in the~~
~~Defined~~ influence events.

DO NOT WRITE ANYTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(9)

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 974

RECEIVED IN
A
16 SEP 1968
EJ1/16

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
15 SEPTEMBER 1968.

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 974 OF 15 SEPTEMBER 1968
REPEATED FOR INFO TO TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, NEW YORK
CAIRO, MOD DI4 HQ BFME, JIS GULF SAVING BAGHDAD AND JERUSALEM.

KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
FOLLOWING SUMMARIES MAIN POINTS OF THE MESSAGE WHICH WAS
PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS ON SATURDAY 14 SEPTEMBER.
A. THE ARABS MUST LEARN FROM THEIR MISTAKES, ABANDON
SUPERFICIALITY AND PREPARE A LONG-RANGE PLAN.
B. JORDAN'S DESTINY IS LINKED WITH THE PALESTINE PROBLEM.
NATIONAL UNITY IS VITAL. BUT A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE ARE TRYING TO
DESTROY THAT UNITY. THEY ARE ILL-INTENTIONED AND INDULGE IN
CRITICISM WHICH IS NOT CONSTRUCTIVE. THIS IS NOT HEALTHY IN JORDAN'S
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. ORDER MUST BE MAINTAINED AND THE SECURITY
OF THE STATE AND SOCIETY PROTECTED.
C. ISRAEL HAS THREE FACES. (I) AN EXTREMIST ISRAEL BASED ON
RELIGIOUS FANATICISM WHICH WISHES TO EXPAND BY MILITARY MEANS WITH
OUT REGARD TO WORLD OPINION. IT WANTS TO TURN THE PROBLEM
INTO AN EAST-WEST CONFLICT BY DRIVING THE ARABS INTO THE ARMS
OF THE EAST BY FURTHER MILITARY ADVENTURES, (II) AN ISRAEL THAT
WISHES TO DESTROY JORDAN AND TO TURN THE PALESTINE PROBLEM
INTO A PALESTINNIAN-ISRAELI ISSUE. THIS ISRAEL WISHES TO
INDUCE THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE TO ACCEPT A FEEBLE MINI-STATE
WHICH WILL CO-OPERATE WITH IT AND SETTLE THE PROBLEM.
(III) A MODERATE ISRAEL THAT WANTS A SOLUTION ALLOWING IT
TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS. THE PREVALENCE OF
ONE OF THESE FACES OVER ANOTHER DEPENDS ON (A) THE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND (B) THE STRENGTH OF ARAB RESISTANCE.

/D.

D. IT IS THE DUTY OF THE INTERNATIONAL FAMILY TO SUPPORT A JUST AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION. ARAB RIGHTS, ESPECIALLY IN JERUSALEM MUST REMAIN UNDIMINISHED THE UNITED STATES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES IF HER SUPPORT OF ISRAEL'S NEGATIVE ATTITUDE LEADS TO THE LOSS OF ALL HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
E. JORDAN SUPPORTED LEGITIMATE RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION BUT NOT DESTRUCTIVE CHAOS. RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS SHOULD BE BETTER CO-ORDINATED AND SHOULD ADOPT A SINGLE PLAN OF ACTION.
F. JORDAN MUST CONTINUE TO WORK FOR UNIFICATION OF THE ARABS. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN WILL IMPROVE WHEN THE HOPED - FOR SUPPORT COMES FROM THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD.
G. ARMS . AFTER THE JUNE WAR JORDAN SURVEYED THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING ARMS EAST AS WELL AS WEST. BUT THE PURCHASE OF NON-WESTERN ARMS WOULD HAVE MEANT THE ENDING OF WESTERN SUPPLIES. THIS WOULD HAVE REQUIRED A COMPLETE CHANGE OF EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH THERE WERE NOT SUFFICIENT RESOURCES. IF RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE THERE IS NO DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING ARMS PARTICULARLY FROM THE WEST.
H. PRIORITY HAD TO BE GIVEN TO THE DEFENCE OF MILITARY TARGETS AGAINST AIR ATTACKS. THE PROTECTION OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES CAME AFTER THIS. A.A. GUNS AND THE MISSILES WE ARE ABOUT TO RECEIVE WILL DEFEND MILITARY TARGETS. THE R J A F THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST AIR ATTACK WAS IN COURSE OF PREPARATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE .
I. MILITARILY JORDAN'S LOSSES IN THE JUNE WAR WOULD SOON BE MADE GOOD AND HER FORCES WOULD BECOME EVEN STRONGER. ISRAEL MAY, HOWEVER, ATTACK BEFORE THESE PREPARATIONS ARE COMPLETE AND SHE HAD NOT YET USED ALL THE WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO HER. ONLY WORLD OPINION AND JORDAN'S STEADFASTNESS WOULD DISSUADE HER FROM THIS.

J. CONCLUSION THE KING PAID TRIBUTE TO THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES AND DECLARED THAT ''WHILE WE SEEK A JUST PEACE THE ENEMY WANTS US TO SURRENDER. HE SHALL NOT ATTAIN HIS AIM.''

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS ROUTINE NEW YORK, WASHINGTON M O D D14, H Q B M E AND J I S GULF AND SAVING TO BAGHDAD AND JERUSALEM.

MR ADAMS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

FFFFF

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No 15
16 SEP 1968
EJ1/16

(10)

JDP 68

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY AMMAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 975.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE.
15 SEPTEMBER 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 975 OF 15 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV BEIRUT WASHINGTON NEW YORK CAIRO MOD DI4 HQ BFME AND JIS GULF SAVING TO JERUSALEM AND BAGHDAD.
M.I.P.T.: KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO THE JORDAN PRIME MINISTER.

THERE WAS LITTLE ADVANCE WARNING ABOUT THE PUBLICATION OF THIS MESSAGE AND IT IS REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT IT WAS A REACTION ON THE KING'S PART TO THE CONTINUING CRITICISM HERE OF THE REGIME'S INACTION IN THE FACE OF WHAT IS GENERALLY REGARDED AS A GROWING MILITARY THREAT FROM ISRAEL.

2. THE STATEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN PRECIPITATED BY A PLAN EMANATING FROM SULEIMAN NABULSI'S NATIONAL GROUPING AND FROM THE JORDANIAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION TO HOLD A QUOTE PEACEFUL UNQUOTE DEMONSTRATION ON FRIDAY. THE NATIONAL GROUPING DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS IN AMMAN'S H Q LATER THAT DAY COMPLAINING THAT THE DEMONSTRATION HAD BEEN PREVENTED BY THE PUBLIC SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND POLICE GUARDS WERE PLACED ON THE OFFICES OF THE JORDANIAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION WHERE THE NATIONAL GROUPING MEETS.

3. A FURTHER FACTOR LEADING TO THE KING'S DECISION MAY HAVE BEEN A PETITION (NOT PUBLISHED) FORWARDED TO HIM BY FIELD MARSHAL HABIS MAJALI (THE FORMER COMMANDER OF THE ARMY AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE) ON BEHALF OF MANY RETIRED SENIOR ARMY AND POLICE OFFICERS. THIS PETITION ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMANTS, PARTICULARLY CRITICISED JORDAN'S MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS AND LACK OF ADEQUATE DEFENCES (? GP OMITTED) ISRAELI AIR ACTION. IT ALSO DEPLORED IN GENERAL TERMS THE WEAKNESS AND CORRUPTION OF THE PRESENT JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS INABILITY TO COPE WITH THE DIFFICULT SITUATION NOW FACING JORDAN.

4. FINALLY THE MESSAGE MAY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO JUSTIFY A POLICY OF MORE ACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST NOT ONLY CRITICS OF THE REGIME SUCH AS NABULSI BUT ALSO THE FEDAYEEN. WE HAVE HAD AN INDICATION FROM

/THE

THE JORDAN DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF THAT SOME MEASURES AGAINST THE LATTER HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN. (WE SHALL BE REPORTING ABOUT THESE MEASURES SEPERATELY).

5. DESPITE THE LENGTH OF HIS STATEMENT OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT THE KING HAS NOT SAID SUFFICIENT TO SILENCE HIS CRITICS AND, IN ANY CASE, MANY OF THEM WILL CONSIDER THAT IT HAS COME TOO LATE. WHILE HIS INFORMATION ON ARMS SUPPLIES FROM WESTERN SOURCES MAY GIVE SOME COMFORT IT WILL DO LITTLE TO REDUCE THE CONTINUING CRIES FOR SOVIET AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS ESPECIALLY SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES AND HIS CRITICISM OF THE FEDAYEEN WILL BE UNPOPULAR. THE KING'S COMMENTS ON THE UNITED STATES (DEADLINED AND MISQUOTED IN THE BEIRUT DAILY STAR) FOLLOW THE GENERAL ANTI-AMERICAN ATTITUDES OF MOST JORDANIANS BUT AGAIN THEY MAY PROVOKE FURTHER CRITICISM OF HIS OWN RELIANCE ON THE AMERICANS.

6. IN GENERAL TERMS THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN JORDAN REMAINS QUIET BUT THE MOUNTING LOCAL OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME AND THE KING'S REACTION TO IT IN HIS STATEMENT GIVES SUBSTANCE TO THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN OUR DESPATCH 1/2 OF 20 AUGUST.

MR. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
U.N.DEPT.
DEFENCE DEPT.
P.U.S.D.
NEWS DEPT.

C.O. MEDITERRANEAN DEPT.
S.A.D.

DIS MOD

(1/2)

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDS ARCHIVE 26 SEP 1968 EJ1/16

(11)

R.E. 2579

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

20 September 1968

Copy PUSD

+ Enclosure 'A'

Dear Daly,

King Hussein's Statement to the Jordan Prime Minister

In our telegrams 974 and 975 of 15 September we summarised and commented upon the open "message" sent by King Hussein to his Prime Minister, Bahjat Talhuni. In paragraph 2 of the latter telegram we suggested that one of the factors precipitating the King's statement could well have been activities of Suleiman Nabulsi's National Grouping (the King has confirmed to the Ambassador that this was so), and we referred to a leaflet distributed by the organisation on the day of the statement. I now enclose (not to other addressees) a translation of that leaflet, which you will see is highly critical of the Jordan Government, together with a more detailed version of the King's statement.

2. The National Grouping, it appears, had planned to hold a "national conference" and not, as we previously indicated, a peaceful demonstration, though in the event there would probably have been little difference between the two. Ibrahim Bakr, a leading member of the Grouping, told an Arab friend of mine that the National Grouping published this leaflet in a fit of anger over the authorities' refusal to let them hold their conferences. Bakr admitted that its timing was bad, and that the National Grouping should be concentrating their efforts on encouraging the unification of the various Palestinian fedayeen organisations. Bakr further stated that it was neither the wish nor the intention of the National Grouping to stage a confrontation with King Hussein.

3. We have been unable to obtain a copy of the petition, also reported in our telegram number 975, which was presented to the King by the ex-Minister of Defence, Field Marshal Habis Majali, on behalf of about 100 retired officers. We have, however, heard that the petition was signed by the officers themselves and that it made the following points in addition to those reported in our telegram under reference:-

(a) the present command of the army (i.e. General Khammash and company) are not equal to the demands of the present situation and should therefore be replaced by officers, now retired, with experience derived from the 1948 fighting;

(b) arms should be obtained from any available source, including the Eastern bloc, if necessary.

/The

M. F. Daly Esq.,
Eastern Department.

The petition, although pepresenting the views of the older East Bank officers and thus reflecting a more conservative section of opinion than some of the régime's other critics, did nothing to endorse King Hussein's efforts to find a peaceful solution of the present crisis. Indeed its emphasis was on Jordan preparing herself efficiently for an eventual military showdown with the Israelis.

4. The King's statement, while precipitated by these two latest examples of the rising tide of criticism against his régime, had in fact been in preparation for some weeks beforehand, and principally as a reply to an article by Wasfi Tel published initially in the Lebanese press (copy of summary from "The Arab World" enclosed for you only), which called for general mobilisation in Jordan in order to confront and overcome the Israelis. Whatever the case, the King's opinions and revelations were not received favourably. In addition to criticism of the length and flowery style of the statement (a page and a half of newsprint) many people have wondered what King Hussein's intention had been in making it and others commented that its only result would be to alienate his critics further. Some people said it was extremely disingenuous of the King to specify how Arab aid moneys to Jordan had been spent. These funds they claimed had been designated for the re-equipping of the Jordan armed forces, but the statement had revealed that only JD.15 million of the total of JD.38 million had been used for this purpose. Where, it was asked, had the rest really gone? But even some of the King's most loyal supporters in the Government, the army and the police considered that his greatest tactical error had been to condemn and threaten those Jordanians whom he described as indulging in destructive criticism at home. While such comments came from persons who have no love for the National Grouping, the presumed object of the King's attack, they considered that his remarks would serve to provoke a confrontation between the Grouping and the régime which would only harm the national interest in current circumstances. I have heard the whole affair summed up by more than one person in the phrase, "it did more harm than good".

5. The King's statement drew a briefer, anodyne reply from the Prime Minister, which has been praised as a sensible, harmless statement in comparison with the King's. We now await the King's reaction to the retired officers and the next move of the National Grouping. After a three month period of apparent inactivity it may be that the National Grouping will now feel obliged, despite their wishes to avoid a confrontation, to take up the challenge which the King had addressed to them.

Yours ever,

John Shepherd

(J. A. Shepherd)

Copied (without enc.) to Chanceries at Tel Aviv, Beirut, Cairo, Washington and UKMIS New York; H.M. Consulate-General in Jerusalem, H.Q. B.F.N.E., J.I.S. Gulf, MOD DI4.

Translation of statement by the Executive
Committee of the National Grouping in Jordan
dated 13 September, 1968

In view of the seriousness of the situation which our country faces as a result of the refusal of the Zionist enemy to withdraw from the West Bank and of their insistence on annexing Jerusalem and judaizing it, and resulting from the increase of the enemy's aggression against the East Bank, the National Grouping called for the holding of a national conference on the 13th of September, 1968 in the building of the Lawyers Association in Amman to discuss and debate the policy to be supported in order to withstand the Zionist aggression and drive it back. However, the Government forbade the holding of this conference and banned the Lawyers Association from holding the meeting in its Headquarters. It also threatened to use force if the Lawyers Association persisted in holding the conference.

2. The Government has taken these arbitrary steps to prevent the citizens from meeting to discuss the fate of their country, the liberation of the stolen parts of their country and the victory of their brothers labouring under the yoke of Zionist occupation, and the means of defending the citizens, towns and villages and their families and children; thereby the Government has only marked itself as supressing the basic freedom of its citizens and insisting upon a policy of oppression and terrorism which was imposed upon the people in the years prior to the war of the 5th of June.

3. The reason which made the National Grouping call for this conference was the Government's failure to carryout its basic tasks, and we summarise this failure in the following important matters:

(a) At a time when Americanis following a policy antagonistic to Arab rights, and in complete support of the Zionist villain, the authorities ignored the definite popular wish and made an arms agreement with America. How can American arming of our army be sufficiently effective as long as America declares publicly that she wishes to maintain the balance of power in the area in favour of Israel?

(b) Failure to withstand the Zionist enemy's treacherous aggression especially the bombing of the Salt area and distribution from the air of poisonous leaflets against the citizens of the Fedayeen;

(c) Backwardness in setting the country on a war footing, and in preparing the fighting people and in building popular resistance, trained and organised and armed with all the necessary arms.

(d) Continuing to follow the policy of lulling the people and directing their gaze only towards the task of Dr. Jarring, regardless of refusal or acceptance of the Security Council Resolution, at a time when it is to be known that Israel refuses to carryout this resolution and that Israel continues to judaize Jerusalem and to settle Jews in the rest of the West Bank.

(e) Continuing to rely on a policy of favouritism in the machinery of the state instead of purging this machinery in the light of the putrefaction which the defeat of the June war revealed;

/(f)

(f) Placing obstacles before Fedayeen operations instead of protecting them and supporting them and placing at their disposal all the facilities necessary for their freedom of action;

(g) Backwardness in following a clear, fully studied and sound policy to strengthen determination and expamd popular resistance to the occupation on the West Bank and develop it;

(h) Backwardness in following a national information policy, especially on Television and Radio, which would kindle the enthusiasm of the masses of the West Bank for resistance to the occupation, and which would encourage the citizens on the East Bank to withstand acts of aggression.

JORDAN PRESS EXTRACTS,
Saturday, 14.9.1968.

Headlines :-

Ad-Dustour : King Hussein's message to Prime Minister Bahjat al Talhouni. (Repeated in Ad-Difaa).

Ad-Difaa : Unification of the Palestine National Liberation Front and the Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh). (Repeated in Ad-Dustour).

Ad-Dustour and Ad-Difaa

King Hussein's message to Prime Minister Bahjat al Talhouni

Amman : King Hussein sent a message to Prime Minister Bahjat al Talhouni yesterday. After referring to his confidence in the Prime Minister and to the fact that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is the homeland of all Palestinians, King Hussein said :"A nation, which shows steadfastness and is moved by its losses to face challenges, will rise and survive...Israel can be resisted only by far-reaching Arab planning, a complete reorganisation, determination and self-sacrifice.."We must draw a lesson from the bitter lessons of the past if it is our wish to attain our aims and regain our rights. The way to this lies in our abandonment of superficiality, in a radical rectification of our faults and in the preparation of a far-reaching objective plan... Since our destiny is entirely linked with the Palestine cause and our rights in Palestine, we must say quite frankly that those who believe in national unity belong to us and are with us and that those who do not believe in it are against us.. Force lies in unity and solidarity... I have never harboured feelings of hatred against any person...In the past, I endeavoured to remove all that weakened solidarity and unity because of the effect of exotic trends and of departure from the national course.. In view of existing dangers, I find that the only pathway to safety and success lies in the implementation of a similar policy in a firm manner.. I emphasize the need for this, especially as a handful of people are making efforts to destroy steadfastness...These people indulge in criticism in a manner which is not constructive.. I have done my best to explain to those concerned the secret implications of things. I frequently replied to every question. Unfortunately, I found that the trouble lay in their intentions. The remedy in all cases of this kind must be effective and firm to maintain order, protect the state machines and safeguard the security of the society. Although responsible men are shouldering heavy burdens and responsibilities, this is not a healthy situation for a people living the tragedy and wishing to attain aims... Israel has three faces, of which one occasionally overshadows the others. The first is one of extremism caused by religious fanaticism and linked to the core of the (Palestine) problem. It wants to dominate not only the territories now occupied by Israel but also other parts of the Arab world. It was blinded by Israel's military achievements and arrogance.

/2...

King Hussein's message to Prime
Minister Bahjat al Talhouni (Cont'd)

It now pays no attention to world opinion... To attain its aim, it considers that the spirit of Arab steadfastness and resistance in the occupied territories must be destroyed. It knows the extent of the links between us and our kinsfolk in these territories. Accordingly, it understands that the way to attain its aims lies in the possibility of destroying us here so that the Arab world will be shaken... This will engage the attention of the Arabs for a long time and affect their ability to face the enemy when they become ready because of the enemy's advance to positions in Arab territory and new natural hindrances like the desert. It tries to convert the Arab-Zionist conflict into a conflict between the East and the West. It feels that another successful adventure may lead to this because the Arabs, who face the problem of Zionist influence in the West and, particularly, in the United States, will, in such a case, turn to the East. The second face attempts to turn the problem into a Palestinian-Israeli issue... It tries to induce the people of Palestine to accept the establishment of a feeble mini-state that will fully cooperate with it and hopes to settle the question on this basis. It seeks to destroy us here so that it can attain its aim. The third face is moderate. It seeks a State with a Jewish majority and a solution of its problems with its neighbours. But the extent to which it will go is not clear. The question of the three faces and the prevalence of one over the others depends on two factors : 1- the international situation and world opinion; and 2- the steadfastness of the Arabs and, particularly, Jordan... We are advocates of a just peace. We have rights, which we will not abandon whatever the circumstances...Our rights undiminished must be preserved in our territory and in Jerusalem.. It is the duty of members of the international family, particularly the Great Powers, to support a just and honourable solution...It is the duty of these members, particularly the United States, whose support for Israel's negative attitude may lead to the loss of all hope of establishing a just and honourable peace in this area, to do this. If the opportunity of establishing a just and honourable peace in the area is not seized at this stage, the Government of the United States will not be able to evade responsibility. They will be responsible for the consequences, which will not serve the interests of anybody.... We must show self-reliance and determination to defend our land and rights...The losses suffered by our armed forces in June 1967 in arms, equipment and ammunition were estimated at JD.70 million.. The Arab summit conference was held in Khartoum on 29.8.1967 following the setback suffered by Arab forces and the loss of land. This means that, if it must take place, the coming Arab fight against Zionist military forces will, unless there is a change in the attitude of the Great Powers etc., have to begin on Arab land... The summit conference decided to follow the course of political action to remove traces of the aggression and to give financial support to the States, which suffered as a result of the aggression.. Jordan's share of JD.40 million was appropriated as follows :

/3...

King Hussein's message to Prime Minister Bahjat al Talhouni (Cont'd)

1- for purposes of strengthening the steadfastness of inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, meeting the requirements of evacuees, dealing with the effect of the June tragedy on our economy, covering the deficit in our income, meeting the requirements arising from repeated acts of aggression against us etc.

2- for purposes of the armed forces and their requirements.

Following the devaluation of the Pound Sterling, this aid fell to JD.38 million... In consequence, it has not been possible to appropriate more than JD.15 million of this aid for purposes of the armed forces annually. To secure the requirements of these forces, steps were taken to make good the losses suffered by them in the June war (estimated at JD.70 million). In the international field, the ice began to melt as a result of our contacts and international circles began to support us and our rights... The Security Council adopted a resolution on November 22, 1967, emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and calling for the withdrawal of the occupation forces from all the territories occupied by them, the termination of the state of belligerency, acknowledgement of the right of all concerned to live in peace and security within recognized international boundaries, guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways and achieving a just and lasting settlement of the refugee problem. We began our efforts to hold another meeting of Arab leaders in order to study the new situation arising from the adoption of this resolution, to prepare a comprehensive and far-reaching Arab workplan, to mobilize potentialities and to prepare for all eventualities. We hope that these attempts will succeed now that the blemishes have disappeared from the Arab atmosphere... In the internal field, we studied the circumstances of the tragedy and began a reorganisation according to requirements and the availability of resources. We enlisted the help of loyal experts and deployed our forces in the best possible manner to face any act of aggression. It has been shown that self-reliance, determination and the use of available arms efficiently lead to the best results. We fought many battles, including the Karameh battle, which became a turning-point. As for Arab resistance in the occupied territory, we have announced that we refuse to be responsible for the security and safety of the Israeli occupation forces as long as they remain on this land. We have announced that we are staunch supporters of legitimate resistance - passive and positive - to occupation... But we have always declared our opposition to destructive chaos... We are determined to establish complete co-ordination with all loyal workers for lofty aims... We consider our brethren, who are suffering as a result of occupation and showing steadfastness, as a symbol of true nationalism and genuine courage... It is our duty to help these brethren to maintain their steadfastness until we can save them and regain our rights undiminished... We must make further efforts to acquaint the world with Israeli acts of aggression against Arabs in the occupied territories... The existence of a number of resistance

/4...

King Hussein's message to Prime
Minister Bahjat al Talhouni (Cont'd)

organisations, the absence of co-ordination between these organisations and the fact that they are not committed to a unified objective plan cause harm.. This gives the enemy an opportunity for dealing its blows and continuing its expansionist policy... We must rise to the level of the requirements of the struggle, co-ordinate our efforts and work together for the attainment of our unified aim. In the field of Arab affairs, we will continue to work for unifying the ranks and preparing them for facing not only the Zionist danger but also all dangers that threaten the Arab world at large. We shall continue our efforts to co-ordinate the military effort and to mobilize potentialities so that we can ward off dangers. The existing situation, however, requires us to follow a policy of self-reliance. The position will improve and our strength will increase when the hoped-for support comes from our brethren." Referring to questions raised regarding armament, King Hussein said :"We do not manufacture arms. We acquire arms. Arms can be obtained from the West and the East. Arms are manufactured mostly for use in the defence of the producing State and also for the maintenance of a balance in the world.. Arms become Arab arms when Arabs hold them. From the start, our situation required that our arms should come from the West... Following June 1967, my belief in the need for obtaining arms from any source in view of difficulties in obtaining arms from traditional sources prompted me to make great efforts, which were successful. The question of obtaining arms from one source or another, when necessary, became a matter connected only with the availability of the required funds. In face of the danger of an act of aggression at any moment and after our acceptance of the U.N. Security Council's resolution of last November 22 and the announcement of our readiness to implement it completely, I found that it was necessary to study the possibilities of obtaining direct military support from any foreign quarter able to support us against a large-scale Israeli attack. I found that, in the event of an attack of this kind, the support would be political and moral and that there would be readiness to sell us arms whenever we desired to buy them. This was a basic factor leading to efforts on my part to remove obstacles preventing the supply of arms to us from our traditional western sources. In addition to problems of training, however simple they may be, the purchase of non-western arms by us means the discontinuation of western supplies to us. In other words, a complete change will be unavoidable and our available resources are not enough for this purpose. It was confirmed in June 1967 and afterwards that our method of stockpiling all arms was sound. In spite of our losses, there were arms that remained. We still use these arms. The call for unifying the arms of all the Arab States is sound provided that arms can be manufactured by the Arabs or be obtainable always... There is no difficulty whatsoever in obtaining arms, if resources are available, particularly from the West. Following is a statement of available resources :

/5...

..

King Hussein's message to Prime Minister Bahjat al Talhouni (Cont'd)

Our losses in June	JD.70,000,000
Appropriation for the armed forces after the summit conference	JD.15,000,000
Amount contributed by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi	JD. 5,000,000
Amount contributed by Qatar	£Stg. 500,000
Amount contributed by Bahrain	£Stg. 150,000
Amount contributed by Dubai, including contributions by Jordanian subjects in Dubai	JD. 60,000
Amount contributed by Saudi Arabia (to be paid by Saudi Arabia direct to the supplier. In this case the supplier is Britain.)	£Stg.15,000,000

Delivery of arms by all suppliers takes place after preparation, manufacture or modification of the arms. Arms are later shipped as soon as possible because, in some cases, they are not immediately available.. The arrival of all arms will take place according to a carefully studied plan. Some time ago, we reached an agreement under which the U.S. Government would provide us with military requirements ordered by us. The value of these requirements amounts to JD.36 million payable in three years. Large consignments of these arms have arrived by air and sea. The balance will arrive according to schedule." Referring to the construction of large air-raid shelters, King Hussein said :"Such shelters are not being constructed because, notwithstanding the heavy expenses which their construction entails, they do not provide protection in the event of a direct hit. The enemy's jet aircraft can reach Amman a few seconds after crossing the cease-fire line and citizens will not have enough time to reach such shelters. Furthermore, the digging of trenches and the fortification of a place in each house will fulfil the purpose..." Referring to the call for placing anti-aircraft guns everywhere, His Majesty said :"Notwithstanding their limited effect when compared with anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft guns are distributed in the same way as the missiles, which we are about to receive, are distributed to cover military targets and air bases. Our ability to reply to any act of aggression lies in the security of these targets and bases. The turn of towns and villages comes afterwards." His Majesty called attention to the infiltration of agents, spies etc. His Majesty added :"A highly trained air force is the most effective weapon which we can use in resisting the enemy's air force... Anti-aircraft guns and ground-to-air missiles are fixed weapons of limited effect. The most effective weapon referred to above is in course of preparation as soon as possible." Referring to discharged officers, the King said :"I am satisfied that no person was discharged without any reasonable excuse. No person is released unless another qualified and able person is found to replace him.

/6...

King Hussein's message to Prime Minister Bahjat al Talhouni (Cont'd)

Released officers and other ranks can render many services to the Jordanian family. They always enjoy our confidence. They provide the best reserve force. Their part in the ranks of popular resistance, which is being organised and which grows according to the availability of resources, is a basic one." King Hussein said that public liberties were being safeguarded according to the provisions of the Constitution and the law. He wondered what other liberties were being sought and asked :"Are they the liberties that allow the destruction of the Jordanian edifice ? " He said :"We defend freedom and construction. We believe in allowing constructive criticism at all times. This is the freedom which we shall defend for ever. We cannot allow other forms of freedom.. The situation requires us to confront all such offences firmly... With the arms that we have obtained and those that we are about to acquire, the readiness being shown by our Arab brethren to help us in building a deterrent land and air force and the preparation of a studied comprehensive programme and a serious plan, we shall build the modern force to which we all aspire... We ensure that every fils is spent on building our force... Our land and air preparations will join in the fight when the circumstances of the battle impose this and after completion of these preparations so that arms can be used efficiently to ensure the achievement of acceptable results. In brief, all the losses of the June war will be made good within a short period and all our land and air forces will reach a degree of ability and strength which we have never known before. But we must not exclude the possibility of Israel imposing a battle on us and on the Arab nation - as she did in 1956 and 1967 - before we complete our preparations and reach a balance. Israel has not yet used all her weapons against us. She has not yet used all the methods of suppression against our brethren in the occupied territories. She has not yet resorted to the destruction of our vital establishments. She has not yet bombed our populated towns. She has not yet resorted to germ warfare. Israel had for some time the ability to develop nuclear weapons. All or some of these weapons may be used against us. Only the international situation and world opinion and the gains which we can achieve for our cause will dissuade Israel from this.... We also must maintain our steadfastness and determination to fight in every field until we regain our just and legitimate rights..."His Majesty paid tribute to the Jordanian armed forces, to the Arab forces stationed in Jordan, to supporters in various parts of the Arab world, to the "brethren" in the Islamic world and to supporters of justice everywhere... His Majesty warned against defeatists and those whose aim was to cast doubts to make the people despair. He concluded :"While we seek a just peace, the enemy wants us to surrender. The enemy shall not attain its aim..."

/7...

...ances of an
...perty and stated
...as endanger the maint-
enance of the peace."

"THE ARAB WORLD" - 19/8/68

FORMER PREMIER SUBMITS NOTE TO KING HUSSEIN — Jordan

Wasfi Tal Proposes Turning Jordan Into "War Society", Reorganization of Armed Forces, And Making Commando Activity Part of the Overall Jordanian Military Effort

Wasfi Tal, a former Jordanian Premier and a member of King Hussein's Advisory Council formed after the June war, has submitted an important note to the Jordanian Monarch proposing that all of Jordan be turned into a war society to face the Israeli threat, and to seek the eventual elimination of the state of Israel. He proposed reorganising the Jordanian armed forces, and incorporating Palestinian commandos into the overall Jordanian military effort.

Text of Tal's note was published over the weekend in Beirut's weekly AL JADID, which take special interest in Jordanian affairs. The weekly said that contents of the note were based on a meeting the former Premier had had with King Hussein a few days earlier. It suggested that the interview took place a few days after the Israeli raid on Es-Salt.

Israel Out To Destroy Jordan. **Mr Tal, who was several times Premier and who is known to b still close to King Hussein, based his entire argument on the conviction that Israel is out to destr Jordan and its regime. He maintained:**

"Collapse of the Jordanian regime and system is now the main target of the Israeli strategy. It is an urgent mission which the Israelis are trying to fulfill by all means --such as military raid large-scale intelligence infiltration, psychological warfare...sowing the seeds of disunity (among Jordanians) and suspending the country's (economic) production." Tal argued that the Israelis were being helped indirectly by a number of elements on the Arab side, such as: 1.Absence of a deterrent scheme to confront the Israeli aggression at the military, political, economic and popular levels. 2. A general "laxness" resulting from failure to take decisive decisions and from corruption and chaos in the government administration in Jordan. 3.Certain international quarters wh ich see in Jordan's collapse "a key to the final liquidation of the Palestine question." 4.Certain Arab quarters which arouse ideological conflicts claiming that these conflicts were essential for the Arab fourth round with Israel. 5.Arab defeatists. 6.Certain factions or persons "who continue the old vendettas, considering the collapse of Jordan a part of the revolutionary struggle... and who...claim that the road to Tel Aviv should pass by Amman..." [This was a slogan used be fore the June war by the Syrian radical regime]. 7.Certain elements "who have taken for granted that Jordan is collapsing...and therefore have been acting on this basis, thinking only of ensuring their selfish and financial interests." And 8.Israel's feeling that the Hashimite Kingdom of Jord is the "stumbling bloc in the face of liquidation of the Palestine question."

What Israel Hopes To Achieve. **From collapse of the Jordanian regime, Israel hopes to force Jordan to surrender completely or sign a peace treaty with the Israelis unilaterally. This would de stroy Arab resistance, Tal said, and maintained: "Even if the Arabs decided to continue the resistance from a base other than Jordan, they will need a long time todo it. And it is time that Isra**

needs to swallow up the occupied Arab areas."

It's Not The Commandos. Tal refuted the Israeli claim that its continuous attacks on Jordan were in reprisal to commando activity emanating from Jordanian territory. He said that these attacks would have taken place even if there were no commandos in Jordan, because Israel's goal is to see the collapse of Jordan and make it surrender to its will.

Jordan Cannot Wait. The former Premier warned that Jordan cannot wait much longer in order to fortify itself against Israel. "It should be done now, now, and not tomorrow", he emphasized, and said that Jordan cannot wait until inter-Arab coordination has been completed, and until an Arab summit is held to decide what should be done. "Jordan", he said,"must be turned into a war society, like the society of Carthage during its war with the Romans. Every citizen who does not participate in the battle, whether it is the battle of economic production or the battle of arms, must either commit suicide or let him be dead."

Military Scheme. Tal then proposed a military scheme for Jordan, that will be fulfilled in cooperation with the Arab states. The scheme will be based on the principle of turning Jordan from a "reacting" country to an "acting one", in the sense that Jordan would not confine itself to merely repelling Israeli aggression, but also making its own strikes at Israel. In order that this be achieved, Tal proposed the following:

1.Maximum fortification of the Jordanian front through "added Arab forces [meaning over and above the Iraqi troops already stationed there], more arms, especially in armour and airforce, and recruiting all those able to fight." 2.Rise of popular resistance "along new lines", namely: "It is known that in every village and every neighbourhood there are numerous retired but trained soldiers and officers. What is needed is to divide Jordan geographically into military areas. The thousands of retired military personnel can be brought back into service,and they can form commands in the village or the city. Each command will be equipped with its requirements of arms. The mission of each command will be to train Jordanians, males and females on the use of arms... These commands also will undertake civil defense duties..." 3.Reorganization of the Jordanian armed forces, "by resorting to self-sufficient small fighting units able to exercise quick mobility and to launch quick offensive operations."

Commando Activity. Tal proposed the following about commando activity: "Commando activity will become one of the foundations of this scheme. On this basis, commando activity will be unified, will have a higher command, and will be provided with the necessary planning, training, money, men and arms. Its efforts will be unified within the general military effort, and its activity escalated 100 times over so it may become painful to the enemy and able to development into the stage of a guerrilla war." Should this be achieved, Tal continued, the following steps will then follow: "1.Escalation of commando activity so it may be harmful to the enemy and so the enemy may be forced to bear the burden of escalated mobilization. 2.We would then welcome any reprisal raid (by the enemy) or any land invasion. We would regard it as drawing the enemy into desperate action. I am confident that if we take the necessary and adequate preparation, we can repeat the Karameh battle several times over. And 3.When we start the operation of exhausting the enemy, we would then be able to retaliate to enemy raids by counter raids. Once we reach this stage,the outcome of the battle would be in our favour." Tal said he did not believe the Arab states would withhold the assistance Jordan will need to escalate its military position against Israel.

Weekend Main News And Trends, Cont'd

In th Political Field. The former Jordanian Premier said that the ultimate goal of the Arabs should be the elimination of the "political existence of Israel", which, he said, would be in favour of both the Arabs and Jews, as Jews would then be rid of influence of the Zionist movement. However, for tactical reasons, and in the meantime, Arabs will continue to call for implementation of the UN resolutions of 1948, and for the application of the Security Council resolution of last November 22. He said that this is the same tactic followed by Israel. He said that Israel's call for direct negotiations with the Arabs was only a tactic so the Israelis may not carry out the Security Council resolution and may not withdraw from Arab territory occupied in the war last year.

Registry No.
DEPARTMENT **E**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
~~Top Secret~~ ~~Secret~~ Confidential ~~Restricted~~ ~~Unclassified~~	~~Flash~~ ~~Immediate~~ }* ~~Priority~~ Routine

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

~~*En Clair.*~~
~~*Code*~~
Cypher

Draft Telegram to:—
HQ. BFG.
No. 181200Z

(Date) .....

And to:—

Repeat to:—
Bahrain
~~Agency~~
Residency

Saving to:—

Files
Distribution:—
Eastern
Arabian

Copies to:—

11301/18/92

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) .....

(Date) 19/9/68

Despatched 0245

CYPHER

[*Security classification —if any*] Confidential

[*Privacy marking —if any*]

[*Codeword—if any*] .....

Addressed to HQ BFG

telegram No. 181200Z *(date)* 18 September

And to .....

repeated for information to Bahrain ~~Agency~~ Residency

.....

Saving to .....

HQ BFG's telegram of 16 September:

~~[Your 160610Z]~~: King Hussein's Message.

The message was to the Prime Minister of Jordan, not Mr Wilson, and we do not have the full text. However, LENGTHY EXTRACTS lengthy extracts are given in BBC's SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS Summary of World Broadcasts ME/2874 of 16 September.

~~[If HS Gulf has no copy but regret Your Contact Agency~~ Residency ~~should have one]~~ The message was also SUMMARISED in AMMAN telegram No. 974.

File.

R.E 18/9.

(12)

LAST PAPER

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.15
~~20 SEP 1968~~
EJ1/16

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 181200Z

TO HQBFG
18 SEPTEMBER 1968 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO HQBFG TELNO 181200Z
OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1968.
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY.
HQBFG'S TELEGRAM OF 16 SEPTEMBER:
KING HUSSEINS MESSAGE.
THE MESSAGE WAS TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF JORDAN, NOT MR. WILSON,
AND WE DO NOT HAVE THE FULL TEXT.
HOWEVER, LENGTHY EXTRACTS ARE GIVEN IN BBC'S SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS ME/2874 OF 16 SEPTEMBER.
THE MESSAGE WAS ALSO SUMMARISED IN AMMAN TELEGRAM NO.974. (9)

SOSFA
FILES
EASTERN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

LAST PAPER

LAST PAPER

LAST PAPER